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Mass indebtedness sets the conditions for political mobilization around 
debt. Fewer U.S. residents share factory floors while the great majority now 
share household debt.1 From education to incarceration, housing to medical 
care, household debt is at an all-time high, having reached $13.5 trillion 
dollars in the third quarter of 2018.2 What if we see this staggering total as 
collective leverage, rather than aggregate individual liabilities? To put it in 
words often attributed to J. Paul Getty: “If you owe the bank $100,000 the 
bank owns you. If you owe the bank $100 million, you own the bank.” At 
$13.5 trillion dollars, the provocation of political mobilization around debt is 
that households now own the banks. Debtors unions—through the threat of 
collective nonpayment—could leverage today’s mass indebtedness, turning 
individual liability into collective power. Precisely because so much of our 
lives has been financialized, debtors exercising power over concentrated 
Identity & Collective Action 
in the Age of Finance
We live in an age of mass debt and high 
finance. What forms of collective economic 
power are possible and necessary in this 
moment? Can “debtor” be a broadly salient 
political identity in the age of finance? Where 
“worker” became a widely salient political 
identity that enabled the formation of labor 
unions in the industrialized era, are debtors’ 
unions possible today? This white paper seeks 
to answer these questions.
5creditors provides leverage over a wide swath of important institutions, not 
just an opportunity to reduce individuals’ indebtedness. The opportunities 
are wide-ranging: debtors unions could demand mortgage write-downs, an 
end to racist lending practices, a cap on ballooning adjustable interest rates, 
student debt discharge, a truly free public education, single payer healthcare, 
or an end to money bail and extractive criminal justice fees.
Of course, neither mass indebtedness nor debtors unions’ potential power 
automatically produces the politicized and coordinated identities as “debtors” 
that are necessary for such a response to take hold. Thus, this white paper 
asks, what work is required for “debtor” to become a salient political iden-
tity? What are the possibilities and obstacles faced by that work?
Today, to be indebted is most often an isolating and shame-laden 
experience. Debtors are hounded by collectors via telephone and mail, 
their credit scores plummet, and along with them, their chances for 
housing, loans, and even employment.3 Morally and rhetorically, debt is 
widely described and experienced as an individual failure—the result of 
irresponsible choices.4 Indeed the rhetoric of financial irresponsibility and 
the resultant shame around 
indebtedness is one of the 
central obstacles “debtor” 
faces as a potential political 
identity. Nonetheless, “debtor” 
has both the empirical and 
the ideological potential to be 
a galvanizing and liberatory identity in the age of finance; indeed, it already 
has been in the past.5 By analogy, consider the shift in social meaning of 
“undocumented” or “queer.” Contemporary movements have mobilized to 
change the lived experience and public meaning of those categories from 
individualizing isolation and shame to counternormative social identities and 
platforms for collective empowerment and action. But this shift requires 
work. To transform “debtor” from the embodiment of isolation and shame 
to collective power requires organizing; it requires changing the language 
and the moral frame; it requires legal tools and direct actions and media 
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if you owe the bank $100,000 
the bank owns you. If you 
owe the bank $100 million, 
you own the bank.
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coverage. Proud political identities—Undocumented! Queer! Debtor!—are not 
born; they are made.5
The intersectionality of indebtedness is a second, central challenge in 
making debtor a salient political category.6 The shift to the financialized / 
indebted household cannot be understood narrowly as an “economic” shift 
that operates independently of other experiences. For example, African 
American women have the highest student debt burdens, as they inhabit the 
intersection of gendered and 
racialized categories that are 
both underpaid in the work-
place and more likely to have 
attended a for-profit college.7 
Intersectionality is an ana-
lytic framework that shows 
how forms of identity—gender, race, class, sexuality, citizenship—cannot be 
understood separately. Rather, identity categories intersect with one another, 
as do the forms of discrimination that too often come with them. We experi-
ence ourselves, and are treated from the outside, according to multiple iden-
tity categories at the same time. In the case of debt, an intersectional frame-
work helps us understand disproportionality and causation: why it is that 
certain intersectional groups, like black women, experience indebtedness at 
rates so much higher than other intersectional groups? In addition to dispro-
portionality and causation, intersectionality highlights how the social mean-
ings of indebtedness—both experienced by debtors and ascribed to them 
by dominant groups including public and private institutions—are in part a 
function of other identities. For example, Donald Trump’s serial bankruptcies 
are rarely pathologized along racial or gendered lines. In other words, his 
debts are rarely understood as a product of his particular intersectional iden-
tity as a wealthy white male. In contrast, the indebtedness of black women 
is frequently racialized and gendered—framed by outsiders as a product of 
gender deviance and pathological family structures, rather than the result of 
intersecting forms of discrimination and inequality.8
Intersectionality demands analysis and action around debt that does not 
privilege one form of identity (class, for example) over another (race or 
proud political identities—
Undocumented! Queer! 
Debtor!—are not born; they 
are made
7gender) but rather recognizes them as co-constituted. Debt’s intersection-
ality can be either a possibility or an obstacle in debtor organizing. It will be 
an obstacle if organizers overlook it, for instance by asserting incorrectly 
that mass indebtedness “puts us all in the same boat.” It will be a possibility 
if organizers acknowledge it and do the hard work of putting gendered and 
racialized experiences of indebtedness at the center of collective analysis 
and action. 
This paper proceeds in four sections. Section I offers a schematic history of 
the relationship between financialization and household indebtedness in the 
U.S.—the contemporary political economic context in which debtors unions 
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Figures 1 & 2 from a Black Lives Matter/
BlackOutCollective action at the Oakland, 
California police station (2014) show 
intersectionality in action. Black collectives 
organized and led the station barricade 
with support from #Asians4BlackLives and 
white ally group Bay Area Solidarity Action 
Team. Images show attention to unequal 
vulnerability to arrest: many older white 
people perform the highly arrestable action 
of chaining their arms together while many 
Black people hold the space, fists raised, 
in front of the police station.10
Intersectional 
organizing 
strengthens social 
movements
Fig. 1
BREAKING: Major action at OPD HQ on Broadway. Activists locked to entrances #shutdownOPD
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8become possible. Section II offers an account of household indebtedness 
from the 2008 financial crisis to the present, summarizing the most cur-
rent statistics on contemporary household debt. This section pays specific 
attention to the intersection of race and gender in contemporary household 
indebtedness. Together, Sections I and II demonstrate that unprecedented 
household debt is a systemic condition. Therefore, it cannot be remedied 
with individualized responses like financial literacy or prudence in household 
budgeting. Such approaches perpetuate the fallacy that indebtedness is the 
individual failure of those who make poor choices in a fair system. Rather, 
systemic conditions require collective responses.
Section III explores the question of how, if at all, debtor might emerge as an 
empowered political identity in response to current conditions. What are the 
possibilities and limits of debtor organizing? Because this is largely a pro-
spective question, there is very little empirical research that tests it directly. 
Section III starts with an account of the possibilities presented by debtor 
organizing, before moving to limits and how they might be transcended, and 
concludes with notes from recent historical precedents for debtor organizing.
Finally, Section IV uses the Debt Collective’s work to date (2014-2018) as 
an ongoing case study of the questions: Are debtors’ unions possible? Can 
people organize categorically in an affirmative way around debt in a finan-
cialized economy? Section IV moves through early failures and victories in 
debtor organizing that led to the idea of debtors’ unions; the pilot campaign 
introduction Identity & Collective Action in the Age of Finance
Donald Trump’s serial bankruptcies are 
rarely pathologized along racial or gendered 
lines. [...] In contrast, the indebtedness of 
black women is frequently racialized and 
gendered—framed by outsiders as a product 
of irresponsible and pathological family 
structures and patterns.
9with debtors from for-profit colleges which has generated over one billion 
dollars in debt discharge as of early 2019; the development of an online tool 
suite and on-the-ground organizing strategy; and finally, current campaigns 
and coalitions including Debt Free Justice California9 and debt dispute clinics 
with organizers and activist groups across the country. We learn four cen-
tral lessons from the work of the Debt Collective: (1) Most basically, debtors 
unions can work. In light of the $1 billion dollars in debt discharge won by 
for-profit college students in the course of the Debt Collective’s first cam-
paign, it is clear that collective organizing of debtors is a viable strategy. 
(2) Debtor organizing requires a diversity of tactics. Because of the serious
reprisals facing those who engage in financial disobedience by breaking debt
contracts, campaigns are strongest with multiple methods of involvement
that are responsive to debtors’ intersectional identities. Some participants
may be well positioned to strike, while others may be better positioned to
use novel legal tools and other tactics developed by the campaign. (3) Both
the law and the social morality around debt are pliable. The Debt Collective’s
pioneering work with the Defense to Repayment clause in the Higher
Education Act shows how social movements can activate legal codes in new
ways, and shift social morality with surprising speed. (4) Much work remains
to be done connecting siloed debt campaigns—like for-profit college debt—
to systemic household indebtedness. Relatedly, the general public must be
pushed past binaries of legitimate vs. illegitimate debt, and toward the idea
that debtors have generalizable power that could allow them not only to
collectively negotiate the terms of their indebtedness, but also to push larger
questions of how we finance basic needs including housing, healthcare, and
education. (5) Finally, since a debtors union would have to be funded to be
effective, raising money for actions and campaigns as well as for long-term
infrastructure building and maintenance is critical.
introduction Identity & Collective Action in the Age of Finance
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This section charts the relationship between financialization of the U.S. econ-
omy and the rise of household indebtedness. In short, alongside the stag-
nating wages and the dismantling of the welfare state beginning in the 1980s 
came an unprecedented expansion of household credit to finance houses, 
cars, education, medical care, even your own incarceration.11 Services 
once provided or subsidized publicly through the social safety net—from 
essentially free public college to medical care to retirement accounts—were 
transformed into private contracts and individual obligations. Between 1980 
and 2007, household debt doubled as a percentage of GDP, with most of 
the growth in residential mortgages, though auto, credit card, student loan, 
medical, and criminal legal debt also grew precipitously.12 This household 
debt boom fueled the growth of the financial sector through loan origination 
and servicing fees, and enabled the expansion of asset-backed securities 
underwriting, derivatives trading, and the trading and management of fixed 
income products.13 In other words, finance flourished on the increasingly 
unmanageable and unequal debt burdens on households. This section 
outlines that recent history in part to illustrate how indebtedness became an 
immersive and systemic condition that now requires a collective response. 
It is now commonplace to hear that we live in 
the age of finance. And yet for the vast major-
ity of people in the United States and beyond, 
the age of finance is experienced as the age of 
debt.
section i.
Financialization and 
Household Debt
11section i. Financialization and Household Debt
Since the 1980s in the United 
States the financial sector’s 
share of and power over the 
economy has grown expo-
nentially, as it has found a role 
intermediating many aspects 
of household existence. The 
rate of growth for financial sector profits has eclipsed both GDP and non-fi-
nancial profits in recent decades. Between 1980 and 2006 GDP increased 
5-fold; non-financial profits grew 7 times larger, while financial profits grew 
by a factor of 16.14 Financial activities—the provision or transfer of capital 
in expectation of future interest, dividends, or capital gains —now gener-
ate a significant share of corporate profits, and have moved far beyond the 
corporate sphere, as this paper will detail. As the financial sector has grown 
over the last 35 years, its role has also been transformed: from channeling 
savings toward productive uses, to an often predatory and inefficient mech-
anism for extracting excessive fees, crafting a dangerous shareholder hege-
mony, and seeking ever-more widespread economic rents.15 An enormous 
scholarly literature variously attributes this shift to a mixture of 1) the inter-
action of public policy and corporate practice; 2) an increasingly globalized 
economy; and 3) an increasingly organized set of social movements. Our 
intervention into this vast literature is to highlight and clarify the link between 
financialization and the rise of household indebtedness.
Beginning in the mid-1930s, The New Deal expanded social wage and labor 
protections, created broad public works and infrastructure initiatives, and 
used G.I. Bill mortgages to encourage real-estate driven growth. The New 
Deal’s substantial public investment in infrastructure supported the path to 
the consumerist American dream: highways and facilities to serve suburban 
development, a broad mortgage finance program for homeownership, a 
public university system, and a welfare and healthcare system for the poor. 
The U.S. social contract of the 1950s—often glossed as Fordism —relied 
on this physical and social infrastructure to subsidize the promise that indi-
viduals with a high school education and a good work ethic could achieve 
middle class status: home ownership, car ownership, upward mobility for 
finance flourished on the 
increasingly unmanageable 
and unequal debt burdens 
on households
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one’s children. A strong labor sector ensured that wages were linked to 
gains in productivity and inflation. For the thirty years following World War 
II, many basic services not provided publicly were affordable on a worker’s 
salary, and it was possible for some households to earn incomes sufficient to 
meet their most basic needs.
Social movements of the 1960s and 70s 
exposed Fordism and parts of the New Deal on 
which it was built as both patriarchal and white 
supremacist16—availing employment, owner-
ship, and accumulation narrowly to middle 
class white men, to the systematic exclusion of 
others.17 
Those who were not white men had been actively excluded from partici-
pating in the post-war system of government-funded prosperity, including 
most consequentially, the mortgage market. Among other demands, the 
civil rights movement and the women’s movement pressed for inclusion in 
the American dream—the democratization of housing, education, welfare 
programs, and credit. These expanded demands on resources coincided 
with the sustained economic crisis of the 1970s—stagflation, high interest 
rates, and the oil shock, as well as a burgeoning Conservative ideology 
that sought to reinvigorate American business interests whose political and 
economic influence had suffered under several decades of populist policy18. 
Policy makers were confronted with conflicting but increasingly organized 
and vocal demands in a time of slow growth.19 It was at this intersection of 
social movement demands, political economic crisis, and the threat of class 
backlash that public policy began to actively promote finance as a solution to 
the distribution problem. 
13section i. Financialization and Household Debt
A number of broad finance-enabling economic policies followed, includ-
ing: (1) the de-regulation of financial markets to push flows of capital across 
different sectors, which led to an expansion of innovative credit and invest-
ment products. (2) High interest rates at the Federal Reserve under Paul 
Volcker to combat high inflation, which established an era of Fed policy 
emphasis on price-stability over employment, and attracted foreign capital 
seeking high returns into the U.S. (3) policy makers relinquishing control of 
credit markets to market-pricing which considerably expanded access to 
consumer credit. 20 
Broad conservative social 
reforms under Reagan 
suppressed the negotiation 
power of labor unions, and 
instituted significant cuts 
to federal funding for many 
social safety net programs, 
including food stamps, school 
lunch programs, Medicaid, 
job training, and unemploy-
ment benefits. As the War on 
Drugs ramped up in the 1980’s, an explosion in the prison population and 
incarceration costs led states to offset the rising criminal justice burden by 
imposing revenue-generating correctional fees on individuals.21 In the follow-
ing decades, federal, state, and municipal governments began transforming 
ever more public services into private financial obligations, most dramatically 
in the student loan market that emerged to fill the hole left by drastic cuts to 
state education budgets.22 This combination of wage stagnation and cuts to 
social programs produced a new generation of households without the tools 
to meet a rising cost of living.23
If this moment marked the beginning of new kinds of precarity for the major-
ity, it was the beginning of a very different moment for the finance sector. 
Financial profits soared with this expansion of credit in the economy and the 
drastic reduction of corporate tax liabilities. The finance-friendly regulatory 
in the following decades, 
federal, state, and municipal 
governments began 
transforming ever more 
public services into private 
financial obligations
14section i. Financialization and Household Debt
regime allowed the efflorescence of newly permissible financial products 
including variable rate loans, asset securitization, interest rate swaps and 
other derivatives. Efforts to spur investment in cities and remedy the discrim-
inatory implementation of Civil Rights era housing laws brought about the 
Community Reinvestment Act in 1977, which effectively mandated the exten-
sion of subprime home loans to a vast market of low-income borrowers. 
Many policy makers and Wall Street professionals understood this moment 
as the intersection of efficient markets and democratized access to credit.24 
It was a new ethics and politics of distribution 
driven by finance and markets—often glossed 
as neoliberalism—but more plainly, it forced 
households to access basic goods through 
high-cost and high-interest credit.
In other words, financialization has been the mass distribution of debt to the 
majority, and profit from debt payments and debt-derivative instruments for a 
small minority employed by or extracting rents from the financial sector.
Financialization has been not only a public policy shift but also a shift in 
corporate practices over the same period.25 The rise of the stock market in 
the 1980s signaled a paradigm shift as the economic role of corporations 
was refocused narrowly on maximizing returns to shareholders. The “share-
holder value revolution,” as it is often called, meant that a fiduciary duty to 
raise stock prices for shareholders too often took the place of a wider stake-
holder view of the corporation that included workers and worker welfare. 
This doctrine, coupled with ongoing finance-friendly market policy and 
beneficial changes to the tax treatment of executive compensation, incentiv-
ized the development of complex contractual arrangements and accounting 
devices to disguise and transform financial risks. Even nonfinancial firms 
began seeking speculative profits through financial investments and assets 
rather than via commodity production. This transformation of corporate 
15
culture and business practices compounded growing income inequality. 
Where average CEO pay increased 937% between 1978 and 2013, workers’ 
wages flatlined.26  Median weekly earnings have grown at 0.1 percent per 
year since 1979.27 
Note then, the contemporaneous shifts: stagnating wages, the decline of the 
taxation-funded social safety net, and increased access to consumer credit. 
This nexus trapped the majority of the U.S. population into growing reli-
ance on private financing. People were forced to rely on credit to compen-
sate both for wage stagnation and for the withdrawal of public goods and 
services including college, affordable housing, and medical and mental 
health care. 
Thirty years of financialization and increasing indebtedness have also 
produced new forms of subjectivity: new ways individuals understand them-
selves and their families, new expectations about the future, new visions of 
the good life. These changes occur not only on an individual level, but also at 
the level of household, family, and community. Decisions about which debts 
to pay become intimate choices about family and household security. 
section i. Financialization and Household Debt
Will my liberal arts degree lead to a salary that 
can cover the $35k in debt I must take on? 
Do I pay my mortgage or my son’s criminal 
legal fees so that he isn’t subject to rearrest? 
Payday loan or bail debt? Can I afford chemo-
therapy and avoid foreclosure at the same 
time?28 
A 2017 report on New Orleans households impacted by the criminal justice 
system—the disproportionate majority of which are poor and African 
American—notes: “Every day, mothers and grandmothers are forced to 
choose between paying bail for someone they love and paying rent or 
16
utilities—if they even have a choice; for many, bail is completely out of reach. 
Fathers have to choose between paying off criminal justice debts and provid-
ing for their children.”29
Today, at least 77% of U.S. households hold some form of debt, and much 
of the debt taken on by low income households is not regularly reported.30 
While mortgage debt has stagnated in recent years, non-mortgage house-
hold debt has increased dramatically. Totaling nearly $4 trillion, student, auto, 
credit card, and home equity debt outstanding has alone increased by more 
than $1 trillion in the past decade. In addition, new or non-traditional forms of 
financing, such as phone and utility bills, medical debt, usurious short-term 
loans, and municipal fees and fines in and beyond the criminal legal system, 
now constitute a substantial burden on a majority of low-income households. 
One third of delinquent debt is from unpaid bills, and nearly a third of all 
consumers report debt in collections.31 Debt is a systemic, often inescapable 
phenomenon that has spread to dominate nearly every aspect of household 
financial life.
PREDATORY INCLUSION
The forms of household indebtedness produced by financialization are 
sweeping and immersive at a national scale, but they are not evenly distrib-
uted. Indeed, mass indebtedness has profoundly deepened pre-existing 
racial and gendered inequalities in the United States. Broadly, the wealth 
gap between Black and white households has widened since 1983, when 
the median wealth of white households ($98,700) was eight times that of the 
wealth of Black households ($12,200). In 2013, the net worth of white house-
holds was roughly 13 times that of Black households.32 Between 1983 and 
2016, the median Black family saw their wealth drop by more than half after 
adjusting for inflation, compared to a 33 percent increase for the median 
White household.33
For Black and Brown majority communities long excluded from traditional 
paths to economic security including pensions or a college education, 
finance has offered a perverse opportunity: predatory inclusion. Defined as 
section i. Financialization and Household Debt
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the “process wherein lend-
ers and financial actors offer 
needed services to Black 
households but on exploit-
ative terms that limit or elim-
inate their long-term benefit, 
predatory inclusion… is one 
of the mechanisms behind 
the persistence of racial 
inequality in contemporary 
markets.”34 Examples of predatory inclusion under financialization include 
subprime loans targeting Black women or for-profit education companies 
targeting single mothers, veterans, poor and racially marginalized commu-
nities. In its most direct and violent form, predatory inclusion underpins the 
“pay-for-stay” financing of incarceration with mounting fines and fees and a 
resurgence of debtors’ prisons. We detail each of these forms below. Here, 
we simply want to flag how predatory inclusion in credit markets reproduces 
pre-existing forms of inequality, albeit on the novel terrain of variable rate 
loans and asset backed financial products. Where civil rights and women’s 
movements fought to end racial and gender discrimination in credit markets, 
leading to victories including the 1968 Fair Housing Act and the 1974 Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act, the market-based inclusion that took hold in the 
wake of these legislative victories came with its own forms of continuing 
discrimination.35 In the place of outright credit denial, we begin to see long 
records of predatory inclusion including credit lines with higher interest rates, 
variable interest rates including teaser rates or hybrid rate structures and 
other “nontraditional” terms.36 If finance offers a new system of social insur-
ance in which individuals are expected to carry their own risk, that system 
has unequal and regressive effects in a society where individuals are always 
already differentially valued by race, gender, citizenship and other intersec-
tional categories. 
These dramatic shifts that characterize the U.S. household under finan-
cialization have been at once encompassing and unequal. The rise of 
debt-financing everyday life is systemic, compounding and intensifying the 
predatory inclusion in credit 
markets reproduces pre- 
existing forms of inequality, 
albeit on the novel terrain of 
variable rate loans and asset 
backed financial products
18
persistent inequalities and prejudices of patriarchy and white supremacy, 
among others, that underpin the socio-economic system of the United 
States. Financialization did not challenge these fault lines, but rather deep-
ened them. Having briefly summarized the relationship between financial-
ization and household debt that developed in the U.S. over the last four 
decades, the next section traces the financial crisis of 2008 and its after-
math, a decade that lays bare just how unequal finance has made U.S. soci-
ety, along already-predictable lines of gender, class, and race.
19
2018 brought a perplexing coincidence of a growing economy and house-
hold debt levels at all-time highs.37 At more than $13.5 trillion outstanding, 
immersive indebtedness unevenly impacts the daily life of households in the 
U.S. more than ever.38 While the scope of the mortgage crisis has dominated 
headlines, a dramatic rise in non-mortgage debt comprises a substantial 
shift in the composition of household finances with disproportionate impact 
on lower-income and minority households. This section offers a schematic 
overview of household indebtedness between 2008 and 2018, focusing on 
how those debt burdens are differentiated by race and gender in particular. 
The statistics in this section help to contextualize the political landscape for 
the emergence of a debtor identity mapped in Sections III and IV. 
MORTGAGE CRISIS
The Great Recession began as a national mortgage crisis, partially triggered 
by mass defaults on U.S. subprime home loans. These individual and unin-
tentionally coordinated acts of nonpayment destabilized the global financial 
system. Novel financial instruments—in this case mortgage backed securities 
(MBS)—had collectivized and distributed individual debt payments into trad-
able products that spread U.S. mortgage risk throughout investment portfo-
lios globally. The effects of a spike in mortgage defaults were deep and swift: 
smaller banks, mortgage lenders and financial services firms closed along 
with tens of thousands of small businesses,39 while the U.S. government 
committed trillions to shore up the largest banks and insurers. Global credit 
markets froze, and millions of people lost their homes, jobs, and savings. 
The swiftness and depth of these effects underscores the tight coupling of 
household debt and finance explained in Section I. 
section ii.
Indebtedness Today:
2008—2018
20section ii. Indebtedness Today: 2008—2018
Mortgages are uniquely central to the relationship between finance and debt 
because their value constitutes the bulk of all household debt in the U.S.—
roughly 70% in the third quarter of 2018.40 
Like other household debts, the importance of mortgages to family balance 
sheets varies across race and gender. While less than half of African 
American and Latinx families hold mortgages, compared with 71% of White 
families41, home loans comprise significantly more of African American and 
Latinx family asset portfolios than those of other racial and ethnic groups. 
The outsize importance of mortgages to Black and Latinx family wealth, 
coupled with the predatory inclusion of these families and communities in 
subprime mortgage markets, led to profoundly racialized and gendered 
consequences of the 2008 mortgage and foreclosure crisis.42
Leading up to the 2008 crisis Black and Brown borrowers were offered 
“Nontraditional” loans with injurious terms uncorrelated to income and credit 
risk.43 Even Black and Brown borrowers who were eligible for prime loans 
were channeled into the subprime market.44 A 2012 study found that “even 
when income and credit risk were equal, African Americans were up to 34% 
more likely to receive higher rate and subprime loans than their white coun-
terparts. Subprime lending was 5 times more prevalent in African American 
neighbourhoods than in white neighbourhoods.”45 Affidavits from former 
Wells Fargo loan officers include “detailed accusations of deliberate racial 
steering into subprime [loans]” which loan officers referred to internally as 
“ghetto loans” issued to “mud people.”46 At the intersection of gender and 
If finance flourished on the subprime growth 
of mortgage lending through loan origination 
fees, asset-backed securities underwriting, 
and derivatives trading, it foundered when the 
majority could not pay. 
21section ii. Indebtedness Today: 2008—2018
race in the subprime mortgage market, “an African American woman [was] 
5.7% more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than an African American 
man; she [was] 256.1% more likely to receive one than a white man.”47 This 
disparity exists at every level of income and increases as income rises: an 
African American woman earning more than twice the median income was 
nearly 5 times more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than a white man 
with a similar income.48
Mortgage lenders also targeted Indigenous communities for predatory loans. 
“In New Mexico, which exhibited one of the highest disparities in subprime 
lending to Indigenous communities, 63.8 percent of subprime loans were 
issued to Indigenous people and 9.6 percent to whites, making Indigenous 
people 6.66 times more likely to receive a mortgage loan from a high-cost 
lender than from a prime lender.”49 
In all these statistics, we see again how intersectional identities of race and 
gender in particular shape the causes and disproportionate effects of house-
hold indebtedness. In addition to causality and disproportionality, the mort-
gage crisis laid bare the persistence of prejudicial social meanings attributed 
to unevenly distributed debt burdens. With one magazine cover in 2013, 
Bloomberg Businessweek (Figure 3) suggested that reckless, financially 
illiterate borrowers of color caused the housing crisis, and may indeed cause 
the next as well. 
Bloomberg’s use of pervasive stereotypes and 
“controlling images” of gendered communi-
ties of color in U.S. political and cultural land-
scapes deflected responsibility from the finan-
cial industry’s predatory inclusion practices, 
moving responsibility onto the pathologized 
practices of people of color. 
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This raced and gendered deflection of responsibility has a long history. The 
Reagan-era “Welfare Queen”—a stereotype of Black single-mothers accused 
of stealing undeserved capital from the state’s welfare programs rather than 
mobilizing “personal responsibility,” “work ethic,” or heteronormative family 
structure — persisted into the Clinton era, and has reemerged today in 
portrayals of the debt-financed household. 
As the racist Bloomberg 
Businessweek cover inadver-
tently illustrates, working-class 
communities of color were a 
testing ground for unjust financial 
practices that ultimately became 
widespread.50 As the global 
demand for mortgage-backed 
securities rose, the mortgage 
industry widened its targets to 
include white suburban commu-
nities with working and middle-
class inhabitants.51 The “nontra-
ditional” features of subprime 
loans, including ballooning 
interest rates or hybrid rate 
structures, deferred and masked 
unaffordability and systemic risk. 
Coordinated interest rate re-sets 
triggered waves of simultaneous 
defaults, setting off the unprece-
dented foreclosure cum financial 
crisis.
Between 2006 and 2013, 
nearly 14 million homes entered 
the foreclosure process, and 
more than 9 million American 
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households lost their homes to foreclosure. These catastrophic losses 
become starker in disaggregate: more than 28% of African American families 
and 31% of Latinx families who bought homes during the subprime boom 
lost them to foreclosure or were seriously delinquent by January 2013—
double the rate of non-Hispanic White and Asian households.52 This is the 
effect of predatory inclusion: 
communities that had endured 
long histories of redlining, 
housing discrimination, and 
land dispossession now faced 
widespread eviction and fore-
closure. While the foreclo-
sure crisis also affected white 
families and majority-white 
communities, intergenerational 
white wealth transfer allowed 
those communities to better 
withstand the crippling devalo-
rization of the crisis.53 
In the wake of the forecloseure crisis, finance continues to structure people’s 
access to basic goods—housing, education, healthcare—but now with 
substantially reduced accumulated wealth. Since 2008, African American 
families lost 53% of their collective wealth and Latinx communities lost a 
staggering 66%.54 In the immediate aftermath of the recession net worth fell 
roughly 30 percent across all groups, but while losses to white families’ net 
worth leveled off between 2010 and 2013, Black and Hispanic families fell an 
additional 20 percent, and other families’ fell a more modest 10 percent.55 
If we focus exclusively on wealth (vs. income), between 1983 and 2013, the 
wealth of median Black and Latinx households decreased by 75% (from 
$6,800 to $1,700) and 50% (from $4,000 to $2,000), respectively, while 
median White household wealth rose by 14% (from $102,200 to $116,800).56 
These radical disparities are particularly impactful in a financialized world, 
since they anticipate a household’s differential ability to pay down future 
debts. 
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This is the effect of pred-
atory inclusion: communi-
ties that had endured long 
histories of redlining, hous-
ing discrimination, and land 
dispossession now faced 
widespread eviction and 
foreclosure.
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Whether mortgage debt or medical debt, crim-
inal justice debt or student debt, experiences 
of mass, yet massively unequal, indebtedness 
build durable poverty and inequality traps. 
Ability or inability to pay ramifies through 
credit scores and reports, which ensure that 
people with lower scores pay higher interest 
rates, have limited access to affordable hous-
ing, and in many cases are denied opportuni-
ties for work, thus reproducing cycles of debt 
and racialized inequality.
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The scale and deeply racialized history of the mortgage market illustrate the 
exploitative intersectionality of household indebtedness.57 But the mortgage 
market is not exceptional; raced and gendered disparities hold true across 
household debt categories - from student loans to criminal justice fines and 
fees, auto-loans to medical debt. In the remainder of this section we offer 
brief overviews of student debt and criminal justice debt in particular (in 
part because organizing efforts are already underway to combat these, as 
discussed in Section IV). We complete the section with brief overviews of 
statistical data on auto-loans, credit card debt, and medical debt. 
STUDENT DEBT
Over the last two decades, average tuition and fees for U.S. based colleges 
and universities have skyrocketed. While public colleges and universities 
were once an affordable alternative, in-state tuition and fees at those schools 
25
has risen 243%, on average, over the last two decades.58 Financialization 
lurks here. As states drastically cut funding for public programs including 
education, universities turned to Wall Street to make up the funding gaps.59 
Debt financing perniciously subordinates educational priorities to those 
of bond ratings agencies, as Universities secure higher debt ratings with 
the promise of ever-rising tuition and complex derivative schemes. Recent 
research concludes that state and local divestment from higher education 
accounts for 41.2% of the tuition and fee revenue increases since 2008.60 
In the authors’ own University of California system, state support has 
declined by 24% since the 2007-2008 academic year. These changes have 
been disastrous for student debt burdens. A household debt category too 
insignificant to be measured before 1999, student debt has quadrupled 
since 2004 and stands at 1.44 trillion as of September 2018.61 Today, 1 in 
5 adults between the ages of 30-44 carry student debt. For millennials, the 
number is nearly 40%.62 On average, graduates from the Class of 2017 owe 
$39,40063and defaults on student loans are now occurring at the rate of 1.1 
million new defaults per year.64  As 2019 begins, loans in serious delinquency 
are at an all-time high of $166 billion65.
In this country, where Black, 
Latinx and Native households 
have just a fraction of the 
wealth of white households, 
where low income communi-
ties and communities of color 
have been shut out of tradi-
tional ladders of economic 
opportunity, an educational 
system based on debt has 
radically unequal effects:
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a household debt cate-
gory too insignificant to 
be measured before 1999, 
student debt has quadru-
pled since 2004 and 
stands at 1.44 trillion as of 
September 2018
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These statistics are attributable both to the pre-existing disparities in family 
wealth, discussed above, and to discrimination in the labor market, where 
the median white worker with a bachelor’s degree earned $63,338 in 2014, 
about $13,000 and $11,000 more, respectively, than the median income of 
their black and Latinx counterparts.66 
Gender also shapes unequal student debt burdens. Women hold nearly 
two-thirds of all student debt in the US.67 “The combination of higher debt 
and lower pay (due to gender and racial wage gaps) presents particular chal-
lenges to black and Hispanic women, who pay off student loan debt more 
slowly and experience more financial difficulties during repayment than both 
white women and white men.”68
Student loans impact people of color—particularly women of color—in the 
most deleterious ways. Despite increased access to higher education, 
racism and gender discrimination prevent many students from realizing the 
economic benefits of arduous years of schooling. 
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More than half of African American households under 40 have 
student debt.80
Four years after graduating black debtors have an average 
loan balance of $57,726, while whites have less than half that 
amount, at $28,006.81
Twelve years after enrolling in school, the median African 
American borrower’s loan balance has grown to 113% of 
the amount originally borrowed, where white students had a 
median balance of 65%82.
More than half of black borrowers and 44% of Latinx borrow-
ers are either in default or delinquent on their loans.
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Repaying
Percent of College Graduates Experiencing Financial Difficulties 
by Race, Gender, and Loan Repayment Status
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Women take on more debt, but earn less after college.
Source: “Deeper in Debt: Women and Student Loans,” American Association of University Women, May 2018.
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For profit colleges offer a uniquely troubling case study of financialization, intersectionality, 
and higher education.83 For profit institutions are often up to twice as expensive as Ivy 
League universities, and routinely cost five or six times the price of a community college 
education. Spending the majority of their budgets on advertising, CEO pay, federal lobbying, 
and shareholder returns, for-profit colleges are notorious for aggressive and misleading 
advertising and substandard education. Marketing themselves as the democratization of 
higher education, their advertising and recruiting tactics disproportionately target black and 
Latinx students, single mothers, and veterans.84 While black college enrollment increased at 
nearly twice the rate of white enrollment in the wake of the financial crisis, a disproportionate 
number of those African-American students ended up at for-profit universities. In 2011 the 
University of Phoenix and the online-only Ashford University produced more black graduates 
than any other institute of higher education in the country. 
While for-profit colleges claim to be a ‘market solution’ to rising demand for higher 
education, they are in fact funded by public money in the form of federal student loans, 
which provide 86% of their revenues on average.
For-profit institutions currently enroll roughly 10% of America’s college students, but take 
in more than a quarter of all federal financial aid—as much as $33 billion per year. In other 
words, for-profit schools are not a “market solution,” but rather purveyors of government-
subsidized subprime education.
For-Profit Colleges, 
Financialization, and 
Predatory Inclusion
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For-profit colleges illustrate the intersection of financialization, debt, and 
predatory inclusion. Government investigations have revealed how for-profit 
recruiters are explicitly directed to mine the intersections of class, race, 
gender and kinship to hook the most vulnerable students. A training manual 
for recruiters at ITT Tech instructed its employees to “poke the pain a bit 
and remind them who else is depending on them and their commitment 
to a better future.” The manual included a “pain funnel” —a visual guide to 
help recruiters exploit prospective students’ vulnerabilities.69 Pain was also 
a theme at Ashford University, where enrollment advisors were directed to 
“dig deep” into students’ suffering to “convince them that a college degree 
is going to solve all their problems.”70 An internal document from Corinthian 
Colleges, Inc. (Figure 4) specified that its target demographic is “isolated,” 
“impatient” individuals with “low self-esteem.”  They should have “few people 
in their lives who care about them and be stuck in their lives, unable to 
imagine a future or plan well.”71
In 2013 the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans 
of America, an organization that offers 
support in health, education, employment 
and community-building to new veterans, 
claimed: “Using high-pressure sales tactics 
and false promises, [for profit] institutions 
lure veterans into enrolling into expen-
sive programs, drain their post-9/11 GI Bill 
education benefits, and sign them up for 
tens of thousands of dollars in loans. The 
for-profits take in the money but leave the 
students with a substandard education, 
heavy student loan debt, non-transferable 
credits, worthless degrees, or no degrees at 
all.” President Obama spoke out against instances where for-profit colleges 
preyed upon troops with brain damage: “These Marines had injuries so 
severe some of them couldn’t recall what courses the recruiter had signed 
them up for.”72  Betsy DeVos, Donald Trump’s secretary of education, has 
been particularly damaging to veterans’ groups, refusing them and other 
debtors the kinds of debt discharge protections hard won by the debtors 
union social movement described in this paper’s final section.73
section ii. Indebtedness Today: 2008—2018
In 2013 former California Atty. Gen. Kamala Harris filed a 
lawsuit against Corinthian Colleges Inc. and its subsidiaries, 
accusing the company of false and predatory advertis-
ing, securities fraud and intentional misrepresentations to 
students. Photo: Eric Rigberg, Associated Press.
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Criminal Legal Fines and Fees
Today 2.3 million people are incarcerated in the United States, over 35% of 
whom are African American men74. Instead of allocating government money 
to pay for mass incarceration, much of the financial burden is imposed on 
those directly impacted by the criminal legal system.75 Between fines, fees, 
and restitution, incarcerated people have an average of $13,607 in criminal 
legal debt alone.76 Bail debts add exponentially to this total. According to a 
recent class-action lawsuit (Fant v. City of Ferguson), the city of Ferguson, 
Missouri—a crucible of the Black Lives Matter movement, where Michael 
Brown was shot and killed—runs a modern debtors’ prison scheme in which 
impoverished people are routinely jailed for inability to pay criminal legal 
debts. The lawsuit details how Ferguson families are routinely compelled to 
use money needed for food, clothing, rent, and utilities to pay ever-increas-
ing court fines, fees, costs, and surcharges. When they can’t pay, they’re 
imprisoned. In 2014, Ferguson generated 21 percent of its municipal budget 
from fines and fees. And Ferguson is not alone. From Missouri to California, 
Ohio to Michigan, Louisiana to Washington State to Alabama, the criminal 
legal system is “systematically and purposefully taking money from the pock-
ets of poor people—disproportionately African Americans—to put into court 
and city coffers.” In short, “because of long-standing and pervasive racial 
bias at every juncture of the criminal justice system, criminal justice fees fall 
disproportionately on residents of color. [...] Significant racial stratifications 
in income, wealth, and job stability make it so that high fees directly lead to 
disproportionate and inequitable harms on already economically vulnerable 
communities of color.”77 This is the nexus of financialization, household debt, 
and racism at its most horrifying.
Family members on the outside—disproportionately women of color living 
at or below the poverty line—often assume responsibility for debts incurred 
by loved ones in the criminal legal system. “Women bear the brunt of the 
costs—both financial and emotional—of their loved one’s incarceration.” 
Based on data gathered in collaboration with 20 community-based orga-
nizations across the United States, deVuono Powell et al (2015) concluded 
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that in 63% of cases they documented, family members on the outside were 
primarily responsible for court-related debts associated with conviction. Of 
the family members primarily responsible for these debts, 83% were women. 
This is a paradigmatic illustration of disproportionate household debts at 
the intersection of race and gender. African American and Latinx men are 
disproportionately policed and incarcerated, and it is the women in their 
families—mothers and grandmothers, wives and girlfriends—who struggle to 
pay down debts while also managing household costs including those asso-
ciated with children, rent, food, and other basic necessities. 
Adverse consequences of criminal legal debt stay with people long after 
they’ve left jail or prison. The inability to make debt payments can subject 
people to re-arrest and also put their public benefits at risk. Because the 
failure to pay court debt is often a violation of parole or probation, individu-
als who can’t afford to pay may be cut off from benefits such as TANF, food 
stamps, housing assistance, and Supplemental Security Income for seniors 
and people with disabilities. Finally, in many jurisdictions, expungement 
processes—the ability to get convictions wiped off criminal records in order 
to access jobs or housing—cannot proceed until these debts have been paid 
in full. In short, court debt drives whole families to spend years trying to dig 
themselves out from under mountains of bills, shackling people with debt 
long after they’ve served their time.78 
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ICAL DEBT
In 2015, 24% of non-e
lderly households 
(ages 18-64) reported 
having medical 
debt.90
Americans currently p
ay $3.4 trillion 
dollars in medical car
e annually. The 
average household is 
projected to pay 
$15,000 annually by 20
23, a 50% increase 
from 2015, when out o
f pocket care cost 
roughly $10,000 per fa
mily.91
Access to subsidized 
health insurance 
is causally linked to si
gnificant declines 
in foreclosure rates an
d home payment 
delinquency more gen
erally.92
Insurance alone does
 not adequately 
protect against medic
al debt. 7 in 10 
individuals with medic
al debt had medi-
cal insurance at the ti
me the debt was 
incurred. 9
6
AUTO-LOAN DEBT
Total Outstanding Aut
o Loan Debt (Q3 2018)
: $1.265 Trillion
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A study of discriminat
ion in auto lending fou
nd that on average, 
non-white borrowers 
who experienced disc
rimination would have
 
paid an average of $2,
662.56 more over the 
life of the loan than 
less-qualified white te
sters.94
Subprime auto loans h
ave become increasin
gly popular in 
recent years, with som
e lenders also acting a
s strong-arm debt 
collectors. Credit Acc
eptance Corporation r
epossessed 35% 
of the autos it sold, ga
rnished wages of defa
ulted borrowers, 
and recouped sums a
s large as twice the or
iginal loan amount. 
“In 2017, one out of ev
ery eight civil lawsuits
 filed in Detroit’s 
36th District Court wa
s a collection case bro
ught by Credit 
Acceptance.” Wall Str
eet seems to relish th
is deep subprime bus
i-
ness model, and Cred
it Acceptance’s share
s gained more than 
2,000% over the last d
ecade.95
By the end of 2018 the
re were over a million 
more “troubled” auto-
loan borrowers than t
here were in 2010. Giv
en 2010’s 10 percent 
unemployment rate, v
s. 2018’s 4 percent rat
e, this tells us that 
even in a strong labor
 market people are un
able to pay off their 
bills.97
CREDIT CARD DEB
T
Total Outstanding Cre
dit Card Debt (Q3 
2018): $844 Billion.
85
In 2016 households w
ith credit card debt 
(44%) outnumbered th
ose with a mort-
gage (42%) for the firs
t time since 1998.
86
Up to 27 million U.S. a
dults put medical 
expenses on credit ca
rds87, costing them 
an average of $471 in 
interest for a year’s 
worth of out-of-pocke
t medical spending. 
That’s more than $12 
billion total.
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Similarly risky borrow
ers of different 
races, holding credit c
ards with simi-
lar characteristics and
 debt levels, pay 
substantially different
 interest rates, both 
across card issuers a
nd from the same 
firms.89
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While we have presented household debt here by category, it is important 
to emphasize that multiple forms of debt overlap, and deepen precarity and 
marginalization for the disproportionately black and brown communities 
that hold these debts. As illustrated above, households use credit cards to 
pay for medical debt, and lack of affordable medical insurance translates to 
higher rates of foreclosure. 
We also see how deep subprime auto loans get transformed into criminal 
justice debt burdens: in Detroit, the district court system was on the brink of 
insolvency just five years ago, but “is now staying financially afloat with help 
from the fees it collects in cases filed by [deep subprime automobile] debt 
collectors.”79
The Great Recession that began in 2008 with a series of uncoordinated 
defaults on subprime mortgages was not an isolated crisis but an ongoing 
one. 
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The intimate relationship between financial-
ization and household debt that started nearly 
four decades ago, today unevenly shapes the 
possibilities in people’s lives, too often forc-
ing them to choose between an education and 
homeownership, homeownership and medi-
cal care, food on the table or re-arrest. Wage 
garnishment, tax return garnishment, plum-
meting credit scores, not to mention the loss 
of family homes and generalized financial 
precarity paint a frightening picture of house-
hold indebtedness in 2018, with household 
debt at an all-time high.
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Together, this section and the section that preceded it demonstrate that 
unprecedented household debt is an unequally distributed systemic condi-
tion. Thus, individualized responses including financial literacy or prudence 
in household budgeting will not address the problem, insofar as those 
responses suggest that indebtedness is the individual failure of those who 
make poor choices in a fair system. Rather, systemic conditions require 
collective responses. But collective responses do not emerge sponta-
neously. Simply because indebtedness is an (unequally) shared condition 
doesn’t automatically produce a shared or coordinated reaction. Thus, 
Section III turns to the question of how debtor might emerge as a politicized 
identity in response to finance capitalism.
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What are the possibilities and limits of debt-based organizing? This section 
starts with an account of the possibilities presented by debtor organizing, 
before moving to limits and how they might be transcended, and concludes 
with notes from recent historical precedents of debt organizing—El Barzón 
movement in 1990s Mexico, the Jubilee Debt Campaign in the wake of 
structural adjustment programs in the Global South, and disparate contem-
porary work in the U.S. including groups fighting foreclosure, student loan 
debt, municipal debt, and criminal legal fines and fees. 
ON POSSIBILITY
The immiseration and spiraling inequality that characterizes mass indebted-
ness, when viewed from a different perspective, is also potential leverage 
over the financial system. 
section iii.
Debtor as Political 
Identity—Possibilities 
and Limits
This is the provocation of debtor organizing in 
the age of finance: what if mass indebtedness 
is not simply a liability, but also a potential 
collective asset or leverage point in the fight 
for a just and equitable economy and society?
Counterintuitively, financialization may have created the conditions of its 
own subversion. If owing the bank can mean owning the bank, debt’s ubiq-
uity presents the opportunity to transform indebtedness from an issue of 
individual isolation and shame to a platform for collective action. Where 
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financialization is often seen as the foreclosure of progressive possibilities 
(pun intended), debtor organizing presents a new strategy for collective 
economic power that is in fact made possible in the age of finance and its 
inverse—debt. Debt mobilized collectively as leverage through debt strikes 
or debtors’ unions could force the financial system to recognize people, in 
addition to banks, as systemically important and too big to fail. 
A look back at the 2008 financial crisis through this flipped lens - debt 
reimagined as collective leverage - illustrates the potential power and scale 
of debtor organizing. The 2008 crisis was triggered by rising default rates 
on U.S. subprime mortgages. Small and unintentionally coordinated acts of 
nonpayment destabilized the entire global financial system. 
What if that nonpayment had been intentional 
and coordinated? What if there had been 
a mortgage-holders union in which union 
organizers heard from members that they could 
no longer afford their payments, and the union 
decided to threaten collective nonpayment to 
negotiate a bailout for homeowners, rather than 
banks? Or to demand mortgage write-downs, 
an end to racist lending practices, or a cap on 
ballooning adjustable interest rates?
We should ask ourselves why these counterfactuals sound far-fetched. 
Even Sheila Bair, the Republican head of the FDIC during the crisis, argued 
that homeowners should be bailed out. “She was a fierce, and often lonely 
proponent of widespread mortgage modification” during the crisis, and had 
been sounding the alarm on the predations of subprime loans for seven 
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years before the crisis hit.98 
And yet Fed Chairman Alan 
Greenspan and Treasury 
Secretaries Henry Paulson 
and Timothy Geithner 
dismissed Bair, insisting that 
banks be bailed out at the 
expense of homeowners. 
Looking back at this outcome, 
we might say that some debt-
ors—banks and bondholders in particular—were bailed out, while others—
mortgage holders— were not. Imagine if Sheila Bair had the backing of a 
nationwide union of mortgage-holders. The banks have a powerful collective 
advocacy operation: lobbyists and a revolving door of regulators and cabinet 
members who move between the upper echelons of banks and govern-
ment. Debtors have no such collective representation. While the post-crisis 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau aims to protect consumers from 
predatory financial practices, it does so on an individualized basis, without 
a clear mandate or strategy for putting power in debtors’ hands. Imagine if 
there had been a nationwide union of mortgage-holders to participate in the 
visioning and negotiation of Obama’s Home Affordable Modification Program 
(HAMP), a government-initiated program that farmed out the allocation of 
mortgage relief to the same predatory industry that caused the crisis in 
the first place, resulting in the denial of assistance to 70% of the 5.7 million 
people who applied.99 The counterfactual of the 2008 crisis with debtors’ 
unions allows us to imagine the potential of debtors—via their leverage over 
the economy—to exercise political power, to disrupt major institutions, and 
to force elites to enact regulations and reforms they otherwise would have 
avoided. 
In their potential to exercise political power, debtors’ unions work on at 
least two levels. First and most basically, they offer borrowers the power of 
contract negotiation which, to date, lenders alone have held. Are the terms 
fair? What is the interest rate? The repayment term? The fees and penal-
ties? Are contract terms discriminatory by race or gender? Will this income 
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in the wake of the mortgage 
crisis, some debtors—
banks and bondholders in 
particular—were bailed out, 
while others—mortgage 
holders—were not
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stream be securitized and if so, to what potential effect for borrowers? Are 
contract terms discriminatory? In addition to negotiations before the contract 
is signed, debtors’ unions’ ability to threaten or enact mass refusal to pay 
also enables the renegotiation or write-down of existing contracts. Second, 
and more broadly, because debtor organizing targets the creditor, the regu-
lation of lending, and the means of financing the good or service in question, 
it draws public attention to how and by whom things we care about—educa-
tion, healthcare, housing, incarceration—are or are not funded.100 
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Debtors’ unions can exercise their power not 
simply to renegotiate individual debt contracts, 
but also to force open questions that the era of 
finance seems to have foreclosed: how do we 
even pay for things in the first place? 
Imagine, for instance, the power of medical debtors’ unions behind the push 
for single payer healthcare, or criminal legal unions behind the push to end 
extractive fees, fines, and bail. The potential of debtors’ unions, in other 
words, is not merely to refuse and renegotiate illegitimate debts. The broader 
potential is to build power—with collective debt refusal as leverage—in the 
age of finance capitalism.
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ON LIMITS
Despite the clear potential of debtor organizing, there are also serious obsta-
cles such an effort must overcome. Here we discuss three: debt and moral-
ity; the reprisals facing debt resistors; and the perils of organizing without an 
intersectional framework. 
LIMIT 1: DEBT AND MORALITY
Despite the systemic nature of indebtedness today, most public narra-
tives around debt still fault individuals for failing to repay a contract “freely” 
entered. Debtors internalize these moralizing narratives and experience their 
indebtedness with shame, guilt, fear, and feelings of personal irresponsi-
bility and failure.101 Even at the height of the foreclosure crisis, when it was 
perhaps clearest that foreclosure was a systemic problem and not individ-
ual failure, Fannie Mae (2010) data showed that “seven out of ten mortgag-
ors surveyed who had defaulted still believed it was unacceptable to stop 
payments on an underwater mortgage.”102 
The mental and physical health consequences of this moral universe are 
severe. In the U.S. alone, individuals who struggle to pay off debts are more 
than twice as likely to experience mental health problems including depres-
sion and anxiety.103 According to an Associated Press health poll conducted 
at the time of the financial crisis, approximately 12 million people in the U.S. 
suffered reduced physical health including ulcers, digestive tract problems, 
and migraines due to high debts.104 Testimonials from Debt Collective union 
members (detailed in Section IV) attest to the profound mental and emotional 
effects of their debts to for-profit colleges. 
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“It hurts. I used to cry every day, but now it’s just a part of my struggle. It’s 
like being in a strong-arm robbery every paycheck and every tax refund.”
—Kaylee, Tennessee
section iii.
testimonials
Debtor as Political Identity
“I don’t like to admit it, because I’m somewhat old fashioned, and you know, Men aren’t 
supposed to be down and depressed over stuff like this, but honestly, my loans kept me 
awake at night, sometimes. I’ve been ashamed of being nearly 30 years old and living with 
my parents, being the first person in my immediate family to go to college, and yet bring-
ing home a degree that is effectively worth as much as a paper towel. It got so bad that 
I stopped going to family gatherings, even on holidays like Thanksgiving and Christmas, 
because I was utterly ashamed and didn’t want to be seen and known. I never really 
wanted fabulous success, but I did aspire to be self-sufficient and at least able to afford 
a small house and take care of myself. Having mucked that up so hard, I couldn’t bear 
to look people in the eye when talking about careers and degrees. I lied to people out of 
shame when asked where I was living or what I do for work.” 
—John, Alabama 
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The moral, emotional, and physical health effects of debt have clear conse-
quences for potential organizing: “The notion of a diffuse national community 
identifying themselves as “debtors” … evokes images of mismanagement, 
personal irresponsibility, or, even worse, inability to take care of one’s fami-
ly.”105 For debtor to become an empowering political category, these strong 
moral narratives - and the wellness consequences that can accompany 
them—must be transformed. 
The 2018 Georgia gubernatorial race offered a powerful public illustration 
of the moral hegemony surrounding the category of debtor. Democratic 
candidate Stacey Abrams’ financial disclosure statement revealed that she 
owed the IRS $50,000 and held a combination of over $170,000 in credit 
card and student loan debt. Her required disclosure produced a public 
reprimand, with many going as far as to say that her debt should disqualify 
her from running for office. In response, Abrams penned a commentary in 
Forbes magazine entitled “My $200,000 Debt Should Not Disqualify Me For 
Governor of Georgia.”106 “I am in debt,” Abrams wrote, “but I am not alone. 
Debt is a millstone that weighs down more than three-quarters of Americans. 
It can determine whether we are able to run for office, to launch a business, 
to quit a job we hate. But it should not—and cannot—be a disqualification for 
ambition.” Much of Abrams’ commentary is a testament to the intersection-
ality of debt. She writes about her own experience as one of six children in a 
working class African American family in the south. Because her family could 
not provide extensive financial support, student loans and credit cards saw 
her through Yale Law School and into a lucrative law firm job. Abrams’ indi-
vidual debt obligations, combined with financial obligations to family (includ-
ing supporting her parents’ multigenerational household as they cared for 
her niece,) meant that even with a well-paying job, Abrams was still stretched 
thin. Her Forbes commentary usefully situates Abrams’ individual experience 
in the much broader raced and gendered dimensions of financial disadvan-
tage including intergenerational wealth and its absence, and the women’s 
wage gap. Abrams’ commentary flipped the moral narrative: transforming her 
debts from evidence of personal irresponsibility into a symptom of a discrimi-
natory system of debt-financed basic needs, including education.
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Stacey Abrams’ story also illustrates the household debt framework we 
advance here. While it was her name on the student loan or credit card 
contracts, Abrams took on those debts in response to a collective situa-
tion—a large working-class black family, her own upward mobility obligating 
her to support family members who were struggling financially, including 
her parents. “Finance hides the household behind the fictional individual of 
the financial contract. We should not fall for the sleight of hand. Financial 
contracts may tie individuals to the legal responsibilities of debt, credit, and 
investment, but both risk-taking and repayment—with interest—implicate 
broader household economies.”107 As we wrote in Section I, the ubiquity of 
household debt under finance has obscured the familial, intergenerational, 
and collective contexts in which people assume these debts - can the 
household afford college tuition for one or more children? Can the household 
pay for chemotherapy and the mortgage? Can the household pay criminal 
legal debts and car payments? Despite these collective calculations, the 
moral universe around debt remains obstinately individualistic and isolat-
ing, a clear challenge to collective organizing. Once people who hold debt 
contracts have naturalized the idea that the debt is theirs alone to bear, and 
signifies their own failure or irresponsibility, this individualization is a high 
hurdle to overcome, to convince debtors of both the collective nature of debt 
and the collective possibilities for debt resistance. 
LIMIT 2: THE SPECTER OF REPRISALS 
The potential power of debtors’ unions rests in the ability to threaten mass 
nonpayment. And yet, nonpayment of debts comes with serious conse-
quences. In addition to constant harassment from collectors by phone and 
mail, and the piling up of late fees and fines on top of loan principal amounts, 
nonpayment can lead to dramatically lowered credit scores (and thus diffi-
culty finding housing, a job, or taking out a loan) and even jail or re-arrest. 
Table 1 offers a partial account of potential reprisal by debt type:
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MEDICAL
DEBT
Late fees can be added to
the bill, making it harder to
pay off in the future.
The creditor can take deb
tor
to court to seek a jud
gement.
If they win, they can legall
y 
garnish wages or be
nefits 
and/or offset taxes.
Recent changes in the law
make it more difficul
t for 
medical debt to be report
ed
to credit reporting agencie
s,
but it can still happe
n.
MORTGAGE
Foreclosure.
Forced to find some
where
else to live.
Default reported to c
redit
bureaus: damage to
 credit
rating and ability to b
uy a car,
buy or rent housing,
 secure 
employment or access 
further credit. Highe
r rates for
insurance and intere
st rates 
on future loans.
FEDERAL
STUDENT
LOANS
Unpaid balance of loan an
d any
interest becomes im
mediately due
Lose eligibility for deferme
nt,
forbearance, and the abili
ty to choose
a repayment plan.
Lose eligibility for addition
al federal
student aid.
Default reported to c
redit bureaus:
damage to credit rating an
d ability to 
buy a car, buy or ren
t housing, secure
employment or acce
ss further credit. 
Higher rates for insu
rance and interest
rates on future loans
.
Treasury offset: tax r
efunds and
federal benefit paym
ents may 
be withheld and applied to
ward
repayment of default
ed loan 
Wage garnishment: 
employer may be
required to withhold 
a portion of pay 
and send it to loan holder
 to repay 
loan.
Loan holder can take
 debtor to court.
Court costs, collecti
on fees, attorney’s
fees, and other costs asso
ciated with 
collection process.
It may take years to re-es
tablish good
credit record. Stude
nt debt is not 
dischargeable in ban
kruptcy.
School may withhold
 academic
transcript until defau
lt is satisfied.
In 19 states, government a
gencies
can seize state-issue
d professional
licenses from reside
nts who default on
their educational deb
ts.
In South Dakota you
 can have your
driver’s license susp
ended.
Table 1:
Potential Reprisal 
by Debt Type
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AUTO LOAN
Car Repossession
In some cases lenders
have the ability to remotel
y
deactivate car.
Lender can take debtor to
court to seek a judge
ment.
If they win, they can legall
y
garnish wages or be
nefits 
and/or offset taxes.
Default reported to c
redit
bureaus: damage to
 credit
rating and ability to b
uy a 
car, buy or rent hous
ing, 
secure employment 
or 
access further credit
. Higher
insurance rates and 
interest 
rates on future loans
.
CRIMINAL
LEGAL 
FINES, 
FEES, BAIL
Civil assessments (fi
nes)
added to initial amou
nt
Suspended driver’s 
license
Court can issue arre
st
warrant; subject to a
rrest
or re-arrest; unpaid fi
nes
converted to jail time
Subject to coercive l
abor
agreements
Charges cannot be remov
ed
from criminal record (clea
n 
slate court) unless fin
es and
fees are paid in full
Potentially cut off fro
m public
benefits. Because th
e “failure
to pay criminal justic
e debt is
parole or probation violati
on,
individuals who can’
t afford 
to pay may be cut off
 from 
benefits such as TAN
F, food
stamps, housing ass
istance,
and Supplemental S
ecurity 
Income for seniors and 
people with disabiliti
es.
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Table 1 makes it clear that potential reprisals from debt default are serious, 
and have lasting consequences. The full force of law and order can also be 
deployed against those who organize debt refusal actions. Without strategies 
to circumvent or lower these risks to debtors and organizers, coordinated 
debt strikes face serious hurdles. “Still,” writes Fox Piven (2013) “the great 
movements that succeeded in changing history also confronted the threat 
of reprisals, the more so when their refusals targeted powerful antagonists.” 
As detailed below and in Section IV, debt refusal campaigns have already 
begun to craft creative tactics to mitigate these consequences of financial 
disobedience.
LIMIT 3: FAILING TO ADDRESS INTERSECTIONALITY
Campaigns for economic justice that ignore racial and gender injustice 
rarely succeed.108 In progressive politics generally, the false binary between 
class-based mobilization vs. so-called identity politics has been a peren-
nially divisive issue, revived in the wake of Donald Trump’s election to the 
Presidency. Too often as analysts tried to work through the dynamics of the 
2016 outcome, they posed the following binaries: Racism or class alienation? 
Prejudice or downward mobility? But these binaries are false. As intersec-
tionality theory demonstrates, people experience and make sense of their 
lives through race, class, and gender simultaneously. “It is not a matter of 
disaffection versus racism or sexism versus fear. Rather, racism, class anxiet-
ies, and prevailing gender ideologies operate together, inseparably. [...] White 
working-class men understand their plight through a racial and gendered 
lens.”109 Whether it is about normative gender 
roles that position men as breadwinners and fault 
them when they are unable to provide for their 
families, or the inaccessibility of white privilege to 
many working-class white people and the resent-
ment that generates, race and gender mediate 
class inequality. “Economic anxiety has always 
been refracted through the lens of race in the 
United States.”110 
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campaigns for 
economic justice 
that ignore racial 
and gender 
injustice rarely 
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As the statistics in Section II powerfully show, people’s gendered and racial-
ized identities are formative in how they do and do not experience debt. 
Collective action around debt, if it is to succeed, must acknowledge, analyze, 
and organize intersectionally. If debtor is to become a salient political identity 
in the age of finance, it will only be because the organizing work leading up 
to that moment proceeded from a deliberately intersectional framework. 
POSSIBILITIES, LIMITS, AND BUILDING 
DEBTORS’ MOVEMENTS
Given the limits sketched above - the strong moral sanction around debt; the 
specter of reprisals; and the legacy of opposing class vs race or gender in 
building political movements - what might bring people into a debtors’ move-
ment? How have debtors’ movements overcome these barriers in the past? 
While these challenges (and others beyond the scope of the paper) make 
debtors’ unions seem farfetched, it is important to note that they are not 
without precedent. 
In 1996 Political Scientist Heather Williams wrote, “Imagine the impact 
if hundreds of thousands of consumers were to declare a moratoria on 
payments. The banks’ past-due loan portfolio—already at dangerous levels—
would plunge the nation’s financial system into crisis, forcing the govern-
ment to assume the full cost of rehabilitating it.”111 This was not a visionary 
anticipation of the 2008 crisis, but an account of El Barzón movement in 
Mexico during the 1990s. In response to an economic crisis in 1994 that 
radically devalued the Mexican peso, El Barzón amassed a membership of 
hundreds of thousands of people, (Williams estimates 500,000 by 1996), 
rural and urban alike across class and race lines, starting from the problem 
of consumer debt. “Reversing the shame and embarrassment that individual 
debtors feel when they cannot meet their loan obligations, organizers of El 
Barzón [told debtors] that their debt [was] not legitimate debt. It [was] a huge 
scam by a handful of billionaires who control the lion’s share of the country’s 
capital” (Williams 1996: 6). In other words, El Barzón’s campaign directly 
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targeted the problem of debtor morality by suggesting that widespread 
indebtedness was not, in fact, the fault of the debtors, but the fault of a fail-
ing government and financial system that led to crisis. “The El Barzón move-
ment began its ideological campaign by claiming that the loan repayment 
conditions after the collapse of the peso were not the fault of the debtors but 
of the government and the banks.  [...] [T]he power of justice was brought 
to the side of the debtor” (Caffentzis 2013: 827). In a movement that started 
with rural farmers unable to secure new credit for crop inputs and unable to 
pay off old loans, El Barzón expanded to middle class urban shop owners 
and eventually boasted membership spanning class, race, urban and rural 
geographies, and political identities. El Barzón organizing focused on the 
moral frame - reversing the shame and embarrassment - by introducing a 
counter frame of legitimate vs. illegitimate debt.112 As their movement slogan 
declared, “Debo, no niego, pago lo justo” (“I owe, I don’t deny it, but I’ll pay 
what is just”). New moral frames can help people to feel that participation 
in a debt resistance movement is not only potentially beneficial to them, but 
also ethical and even patriotic; their contribution to a more just and demo-
cratic society.
Within and beyond El Barzón, we have ample evidence that people already 
have multiple and flexible moral frames around indebtedness and its conse-
quences.113 Thus: 
section iii. Debtor as Political Identity
“I owe, I don’t deny it, but 
I’ll pay what is just”
—slogan of Mexico’s El 
Barzón debtors’ movement
“debo, no niego, pago lo justo” 
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people do not necessarily need a movement 
to help them reframe the morality around 
debt, which they have often done for them-
selves. Research shows, instead, that people 
need a movement to provide the infrastructure 
for coordinated mobilization of their shared 
critique. 
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To illustrate, Robinson’s data (2013) on foreclosed and other vulnerable 
homeowners in El Cajon, CA shows that many homeowners attributed their 
situation and that of their neighbors to “Wall Street greed” and believed that 
the government should “force the banks to stop foreclosing on people.”114 
In other words, mortgage-holders’ moral frame was already shifted away 
from individualized shame toward systemic illegitimacy, but what they lacked, 
according to Robinson’s research, was access to political organizations 
willing and able to coordinate resistance. Similarly, Stout’s research (2016) 
followed people enduring foreclosure as they found anonymous online 
communication platforms (Reddit, Craigslist) to share critical approaches to 
their shared predicament. “Participants operating from behind anonymiz-
ing monikers advocated bankruptcy, mortgage default, and squatting with-
out payment as mimetic responses to the unethical and immoral practices 
of financial institutions. The anonymity of these domains enabled users, 
detached from any requirement to reveal their identities, to experience a free-
dom of collective participation and to question the dispossessions resulting 
from neoliberal financial regimes.”115 Beyond the anonymity of these forums, 
however, people enduring foreclosure most often did not find organized 
efforts toward strategic default or home occupation. This research shows 
that, 
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El Barzón, the Jubilee Debt campaigns of the 1990s, and more recently 
ongoing PAH campaigns in Spain116 have been able to successfully chan-
nel collective critique into coordinated action. The Jubilee Debt Campaigns 
organized over more than a decade to discharge the debts many countries 
in the global south owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB). In the wake of the oil price spike of the early 1970s, many 
oil-importing nations in the global south were in desperate need of money. 
The IMF and WB arranged loans (with privatization conditionalities attached) 
which proved wildly lucrative for financial institutions in the global north, and 
contributed to further impoverishment in the global south. The Jubilee Debt 
Campaigns and other allies shifted the narrative around these debtor-creditor 
relations, from one of profligate and corrupt poor countries owing generous 
banks, to one of rapacious banks stealing from the world’s poorest peoples 
and incapacitating their sovereign governments. Then Secretary-General of 
the United Nations Kofi Annan spoke to the movement’s successes in 2001:
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debt’s moral framework is contextually respon-
sive. When people are willing to shift their 
frames of blame and causality from individual 
irresponsibility to anger and systemic critique, 
there must be institutional infrastructures in 
place to channel that anger and critique into 
coordinated action. 
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Kofi Annan in 2012
US Mission in Geneva / Wikimedia Commons
That campaign really shamed the 
peoples and governments of the North 
into realizing how debt cripples the 
efforts of so many Least Developed 
Countries to break out of poverty - 
and how wrong it is, both morally and 
economically, that resources should 
be transferred from South to North 
instead of the other way around. I 
don’t mean to imply that the debt 
problem has been solved. As I told 
the Conference just now, even the 
poorest countries, which qualify for 
debt cancellation under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries scheme still 
spend more on repaying debts than 
they do on health care.117”
“
50
This coalition of Jubilee Debt movements in the 1990s succeeded in winning 
the discharge of large swaths of debt owed by governments in the global 
south, and continues to work today against the practices of vulture funds, 
corporate tax avoidance, and toward sustainable sovereign borrowing and 
lending.
Along with shifting the moral frame, direct service provision has been 
another central tactic in bringing people in to debt-based organizing. El 
Barzón, for instance, provided participants with legal protection from banks, 
lawyers and courts in repossession proceedings. Movement lawyers filed 
hundreds of thousands of briefs, thus slowing the process of bank-initiated 
dispossession. “More than five million Mexican households were able to 
renegotiate debts and thousands of properties were saved from foreclosure” 
due to El Barzón’s direct service provision.118 Closer to home, the Alliance 
for Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE)’s Home Defenders 
League offered families threatened with foreclosure direct mutual aid as 
well as participatory actions that targeted banks and government offic-
es.119 Between 2010 and 2012 ACCE was able to keep dozens of people in 
their homes, many of whom then became involved either as ACCE orga-
nizers themselves or as participants in other ACCE initiatives. The work of 
the Chicago Anti Eviction Campaign merits equal attention.120 We can also 
see the successes of direct service provision in contesting criminal legal 
fines and fees. Leading up to San Francisco and Alameda County’s historic 
2018 elimination of a suite of administrative fees including adult probation 
and electronic monitoring, organizations including the East Bay Community 
Law Clinic (EBCLC) offered clients direct legal support with court debt while 
encouraging them to mobilize to pass legislation. And yet in recent history it 
seems to be only El Barzón that has managed to mobilize masses of people 
around debt writ large, rather than dividing that experience and potential 
leverage by debt type—mortgage debt here, court debt there. In order to 
realize the potential political power of debtors’ unions, this kind of cross-cat-
egory debt leverage will be indispensable. The next section offers a case 
study of one organization in the process of trying to do just that.   
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In their own words, “The Debt Collective is a membership organization that 
empowers debtors to renegotiate, resist, and refuse unfair debts. We fight for 
and alongside debtors to achieve concrete results, including the cancellation 
of predatory loans, structural reforms, and the provision of public goods and 
services. Our regional and national campaigns aim to put money back in 
the pockets of poor people while opening up a vital new avenue in the fight 
against inequality and exploitation.” In short, the Debt Collective is attempting 
to organize Debtors’ Unions. 
Founded in 2014, the group has its roots 
in Occupy Wall Street, where several of 
its founding members met and began to 
collaborate. While the foreclosure crisis 
and student debt motivated many to join 
the Occupy movement, in late 2011 a 
subset of participants began to focus their 
analysis and activism around the relation-
ship between finance and household debts 
of all kinds. In Spring 2012 this group 
emerged as Strike Debt, first in New York, 
and then in Oakland. As the group began 
to research and reimagine indebtedness 
in the wake of the 2008 crisis, they held debtors’ assemblies in both cities, 
and produced a series of high-profile projects including the Debt Resistors’ 
Operations Manual126 - an 11-chapter, 130-page pamphlet on consumer 
and municipal debt, and the Rolling Jubilee, “A bailout by the people for 
the people” (Figure 6).127 In the Rolling Jubilee organizers completed the 
legal work to become a debt collecting agency, crowdsourced money, and 
purchased defaulted medical debt and private student debt for pennies on 
the dollar. Rather than collecting on those debts, they abolished them. 
Fig. 6
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To illustrate, Figure 7 shows a Rolling Jubilee debt buy in which the 
group purchased the debts of nearly 2000 debtors whose average debt 
was $6,405 dollars. The purchasing agreement (Figure 5) shows that 
the group paid less than two cents on the dollar for this debt, abolishing 
$12,291,378.56 worth of distressed medical debt for roughly $230,000. 
Before the group put the project on hiatus in 2015, Rolling Jubilee had 
purchased and abolished $33 million of medical, private student loan, private 
probation, and payday lending debt.
The Rolling Jubilee initiative received extensive media attention and provided 
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relief to thousands of people struggling with medical debt or private student 
loan debt. More fundamentally, the initiative challenged central aspects of 
debt’s morality, in particular the idea that debt is a contract between two 
people—a lender and a borrower—morally obligated to one another as indi-
viduals. In contrast to this narrative, the Rolling Jubilee showed that debts 
circulate far beyond the creditor / debtor relationship, into secondary and 
tertiary markets; to debt collectors; as pieces of asset backed securities. The 
initiative also showed that the market value of debt fluctuates radically, and 
can plummet to as little as 2% of its value on the assumption that debtors 
are unaware of — and excluded from - distressed debt markets, where debt 
collectors purchase debts at steep discounts and then harass debtors to 
repay the full balance plus fines and fees. 
Organizers always understood the Rolling Jubilee as a spectacle, designed 
to be a public challenge to the moralizing myths around debt more than 
an organizing tactic in and of itself. With all the media attention, much of 
the public seemed to see the Rolling Jubilee as a magic trick that could 
discharge debts without a political fight or without the cultivation of debtor 
as an oppositional political identity. This depoliticization of the tactic is on 
full display when television host John Oliver used the idea on his own show 
without crediting Rolling Jubilee, or the tactic turns into a charity project, 
as in the efforts of RIP Medical Debt.128 Organizers 
in both New York and Oakland had long been brain-
storming the idea of debtors’ unions as the Rolling 
Jubilee unfolded. One of the Rolling Jubilee’s final debt 
purchases eventually led in this direction, and to the 
founding of the Debt Collective. 
In Winter 2013, the Rolling Jubilee purchased a port-
folio of private student debt from what was then one of 
the biggest for-profit colleges in the country, Corinthian 
Colleges Inc129. Debt Collective organizers hoped that 
this purchase would provide an opportunity to see if a 
more confrontational form of debtor organizing could 
work, in part because of the ways for-profit colleges 
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ROLLING 
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While crowd-source
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relief is a feel-good tactic 
that reliably generates 
media and public att
ention, 
it can also depoliticize the
 
conversation around
 debt 
if not coupled with b
roader 
debt refusal campaig
ns.
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offered a uniquely clear link between financialization and intersectional debt, 
as detailed above.130 In 2013, Corinthian Colleges Inc. enrolled more than 
70,000 students, 69% of whom were African- American, Hispanic or other 
minorities. In 2014, 71% of Corinthian’s enrolled students were women; 35% 
were Black; 18% were Hispanic or Latinx — 58% of the total enrolled were 
people of color; 26% of all enrolled students were black women. At the time 
of the Rolling Jubilee’s purchase of the Corinthian portfolio, the company 
was under investigation for fraud and predatory lending by multiple Attorneys 
General, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, having extracted $1.4 billion in federal grant 
and loan dollars in 2010 alone, more than the ten University of California 
campuses combined for that same year.
Nathan, lead organizer of the Corinthian students
As Corinthian’s many scandals grew 
increasingly public in the summer of 2014, 
a small group of deeply indebted former 
students had already begun to organize. 
Debt Collective organizers met with these 
students, and began to work collaboratively 
toward two ends: (1) a pilot debt strike; (2) a 
novel legal tool to allow debtors to dispute 
their debts through legal channels.
Corinthian 
Scandals
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For the strike, Debt Collective organizers worked closely with a group of 15 
former Corinthian students, the majority of whom were already in default on 
their student loans and suffering the consequences. With the support of the 
Debt Collective, these students—who came to be known as The Corinthian 
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15—were ready to publicly declare their collective refusal to make any more 
payments on their federal student loans (Figure 8).
In February of 2015, after 
an intensive retreat with the 
strikers that included story 
sharing, leadership devel-
opment, political education, 
legal workshops, and media 
training, the Corinthian 15 
went public with their historic 
debt strike. Requests to join 
the strike poured in from 
current and former Corinthian 
students across the country. 
But rather than merely mark 
down all of the thousands who 
wanted to join, Debt Collective 
organizers contacted all 
would-be strikers individually, 
to ensure they understood 
the potential consequences 
of their act. (See Table 1) Indeed, collectors working on behalf of the federal 
government (the ultimate creditor on federal student loans) have extraor-
dinary powers. They can garnish wages and ask the Treasury to offset 
borrowers’ tax returns. They are authorized to seize a portion of a debtor’s 
disability or Social Security benefits to pay defaulted debts, and debtors’ 
credit scores cannot be repaired while the debt is still on the books. 
To broaden the reach of this action to all current and former Corinthian 
students, including those who would choose not to join the strike, the Debt 
Collective also developed an online legal tool (figure 9) via what was then 
a little-known provision in the Higher Education Act known as Defense to 
Repayment (DTR). This provision allowed students to challenge certain debts 
with the Department of Education. With the DTR tool online, between 2015 
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and 2017 the strike grew beyond Corinthian to encompass ITT Tech and Art Institute 
debtors, and the Debt Collective’s DTR tool was used to file 82,000 claims by 
November 2016 according to the Department of Education’s numbers. Strikers were 
invited to Washington DC to meet with the Department of 
Education, the CFPB, and other officials, and eventually 
striker Ann Bowers participated in a negotiated rulemaking 
around student debt discharge.
In January 2017, the Department of Education uploaded 
a copy of the Debt Collective’s DTR tool to their website. 
While they did this with neither coordination nor noti-
fication to the Debt Collective, this cooptation of Debt 
Collective labor and organizing demonstrated that the 
nation’s first debtors’ union changed federal policy 
quickly and powerfully. All told, the Obama administration 
approved over 28,000 DTR applications totaling almost 
$600 million in debt from former students of Corinthian 
College. Tens of thousands of additional applications remained pending as oversight 
transferred to the Trump administration. Despite Education Secretary DeVos’s public 
fight against Defense to Repayment claims, as of this writing (February 2019) the 
Trump DOE has been forced to discharge 
an additional $650 million dollars of 
for-profit debt, bringing the total relief to 
over $1 billion to date.131 
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Fig. 10: Members of the Corinthian Collective entering a meeting with 
the Department of Education, Washington D.C. From Left to Right: 
Sarah Dieffenbacher, Dawn Thompson, Jessi King, Tasha Courtwright, 
Latonya Suggs, Nathan Hornes, Michael Adorno (back), Ashlee Schmidt 
(front), Natasha Hornes (far right).
The Debt Collective’s pilot union 
has won over $1 billion in debt 
discharge and reimbursement 
for past payments for for-profit 
college debtors. Here, Bay Area 
news station KPIX features striker 
Makenzie Vasquez’s fight for debt 
relief, and eventual victory, on the 
evening news. Below, Randi Davis 
posts an image of her refund 
check from the federal govern-
ment to the group’s social media.
Lesson 2:
DEBTORS 
UNIONS
ARE POSSIBLE
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Damn.
This showed me how powerful collective organizing 
can be. Thanks to all the people that helped this 
process. I was able to get my loan forgiven. Although 
the fight continues for many others, in numbers we 
are strong.
You are not a loan!
Who are we? We are the first generation made poor 
by the business of education.We are people living paycheck to paycheck, single 
mothers, and young people just...
2 hrs
Makenzie Vasquez Fig. 12
I got my money ba
ck from what I paid
 towards my federa
l loan!!!14 hrs
Randi M Davis
Fig. 11
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Debt Collective Pilot 
Strike Timeline
2014
2015
2016
Founders meeting in Los Angeles. First meeting with former Corinthian students 
at Ontario Everest campus. Borrowers shared stories and worked with Debt 
Collective to brainstorm strategies for demanding debt relief from the U.S. 
Department of Education.
15 Corinthian students in default decide to strike. Intensive retreat in San 
Francisco includes legal workshops, story sharing, and media training.
Debt Collective launches pilot strike and online Defense to Repayment (DTR) tool 
simultaneously.
Corinthian Strike team invited to meet with Dept. of Education, Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau and other DC officials.
Debt strikers and regulators compel Corinthian to declare bankruptcy.
Students from other for-profit colleges including ITT Tech and Art Institute 
join the campaign.
Obama’s Dept. of Education announces they will conduct a Negotiated 
Rulemaking on Defense to Repayment.
Defrauded borrowers return to Washington D.C. to continue pressuring 
lawmakers to cancel loans and to speak out at negotiated rulemaking.
Department of Education agrees to cancel some borrowers’ debts
Hundreds of ITT Tech students formally declare a debt strike on their 
federal student loans. ITT Tech declares bankruptcy reeling from the pres-
sure from debt strikers and regulators.
Debt Collective works with lawyers to develop online Defense to Repayment tool.
Summer
February
March
April
May
June
August
February
April
June
September
Winter
Fall
11 Attorneys General, 13 members of Congress, SEIU, AFT and other 
organizations endorse Debt Collective strike and DTR campaign.
Debt Collective member and striker Ann Bowers represents debtors’ 
union members at Negotiated Rulemaking in Washington DC.
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Obama’s Department of Education announces it will allow some group 
discharges at its own discretion.
Department of Education numbers report 82,000 DTR claims filed.
Department of Education uploads Debt Collective’s DTR form to their website. 
Obama administration approves over 28,000 DTR applications totaling almost 
$600 million in discharged debt from former students of Corinthian College. 
Tens of thousands of additional applications remain pending as power trans-
fers to the Trump administration. First time ever that groups of borrowers have 
won federal student loan relief on such a scale.
Coordinated member complaints to regulators causes for-profit accreditation 
agency ACICS to lose authorization.
Sarah D., one of the original Corinthian 15 strikers, successfully challenges the 
Department of Education’s denial of her DTR.
Trump Department of Education announces they will employ extra-legal powers 
to delay implementation of the DTR rule.
Harvard University Legal Aid files a lawsuit on behalf of two Debt Collective 
members who attended NEAI
AGs in 19 states and Harvard/Public Citizen file a lawsuit against DeVos to 
prevent suspension of DTR rules
Trump Department of Education continues to delay DTR process and limit relief, 
though some borrowers begin to see loans disappear
Over $500 million in student debt held by ITT is canceled in the settlement of the 
ITT Bankruptcy Case.
Betsy DeVos is forced to grant $150 million in automatic closed school discharge 
for borrowers who attended a for-profit college that closed between November 
1, 2013 and December 4, 2015
October
November
January
April
June
July
October
March
November
December
2017
2018
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What can we learn about the limits and possibilities of debtor as a category 
of identity from the Debt Collective’s pilot campaign? How, if at all, did this 
pilot strike navigate the limits on debtor as a category of political identity - 
debt’s moral universe; fear of reprisal; intersectionality - discussed above? 
And how, if at all, did this pilot strike realize some of the political possibilities 
of debt-based activism?
THE CORINTHIAN STRIKE AND LIMITS 
TO DEBTOR ORGANIZING 
The Corinthian Pilot strike shows that the morality of debt is pliable, not 
only for debtors themselves (who have to overcome shame, fear, isolation, 
judgement from self and others) but also, significantly, for the society around 
them. Corinthian debtors, especially those with whom the Debt Collective 
first began to collaborate, already understood that they had been wronged 
by taking on such steep debt for a school that neither educated them nor 
prepared them for the workplace. In other words, they already had a sense 
that some debts are unjust, and should not be paid. Consider the following 
testimonials:
I was signed the day I went in to the school. The 
whole process was rushed and I was told if I didn’t 
sign that day I would have to wait another 6 
months. I didn’t have time to look anything over 
and I was told my school loans would be around 
$30,000, but I would have Calgrant and Pell grant 
to help pay some of this debt. I was also told that I 
would have choices of schools I could transfer to and 
they were accredited. I was told when I finished I 
would have a paralegal certificate as well and they 
would help me find a job. It was all a lie. I walked 
out of there with a loan over $40,000. I asked 
[an administrator] when do we get our paralegal 
certificates and he said I had to do that on my own. 
I tried to leave a year in because I found out about 
their scams but I was stuck and found out none of 
my credits would transfer. I did find a paralegal job 
that I worked hard to get and thankfully I had prior 
legal experience so I got the job. I worked there for 
almost 3 years and got laid off. Now I can’t even get 
an interview with another law office. I transferred 
to Argosy University and had to start over. Now I’m 
in over $65,000 in debt and capped out on financial 
aid, not sure how I’ll pay for my last 5 classes at 
Argosy since it will cost me $7500 for those classes. 
I’m beyond frustrated.
***
Employees from Everest came into my highschool 
“
back in 2011. I signed up to get more info and they 
kept calling, sending emails for me to join their 
school. I decided to take a tour once I graduated 
high school, to look at options for a future career. 
Everest, unfortunately, was the first school I toured. 
Next thing I found myself signing papers to start in 
August 2011. I felt pressured into attending, into 
signing. I kept saying that I wanted more time to 
think and the lady said they were running out of 
space, that it would make my mom proud to be the 
only one in the family to reach a further education. 
They guaranteed to find me a job. No other college 
guarantees such a thing. Needless to say I signed. 
Now 3 yrs after graduating I am jobless.
***
If the degree I earned is worthless why should I be 
forced to pay? I want my federal loans gone so I can 
continue my education elsewhere. I was swindled 
into signing up. I was told my degree would cost 
7000 instead I owe 60,000 and I can’t do anything. 
I can’t go get a real degree. I can’t pay the debt nor 
do I feel I should have to. I am in deferment right 
now and have no intentions of paying. I am a single 
mother of 3 who was promised so much and given 
nothing.
This school didn’t seem like a college. It seemed more 
like a high school were the teachers didn’t care. I was 
told that I would get a job after my externship, but 
was placed at a site where I didn’t get any experience 
in the field. I was a single mother at 19 and just 
wanted to further my education to land a better job. 
I didn’t have any knowledge of any grants or aid and 
nor did they offer me a choice to this funding. So 
the school suckered me into thinking a loan was the 
only option. Not only could I never gain employment 
until this day, but stuck with a massive amount 
of debt I can’t afford to pay back with a family. I 
wouldn’t know where to go for job placement which 
was promised because these school keeps ruining 
peoples lives, making false promises to people, 
changing their school name, and getting a slap on 
the wrist.
***
They made me pay while i was attending school. 
Some months I couldn’t pay and they would call me 
over the loudspeaker to come to the finance office and 
tell me I was not allowed in school until I could come 
up with the money that month. Also they told me if 
I didn’t pay or go into default on my loans my degree 
would get revoked and I believed this. So when I 
couldn’t get a job after I got out of school and I 
didn’t pay my loans I thought if I tried to get a job as 
a medical assistant I couldn’t because they revoked 
my licence. So I ended up joining the military and 
haven’t worked as a medical assistant ever since 
2007 when I graduated.
***
Single father shackled with student loan payments 
that don’t take into consideration all of my expenses 
when looking for different payment options. I 
would consider taking a pill that erased my school 
knowledge if I got back all that I paid in addition to 
erasing my debt. This is the level of extreme duress I 
experience in which I consider the extreme means to 
alleviate it.
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As these testimonies show, former Corinthian students understood that 
they had been victims of a scam, and thus deserved to have their debts 
discharged. 
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Again we see that people already have a sense 
of how to distinguish between debts that are 
incurred under fair circumstances and with 
fair terms—and are thus legitimate—and debts 
that are incurred under duress, fraud, manip-
ulation, or powerlessness, and are thus illegit-
imate. This already-existing moral barometer 
allowed former Corinthian students to begin 
partially reframing their shame and fear as a 
demand for justice. This reframing—coupled 
with the infrastructure and solidarity provided 
by the Debt Collective—enabled them to 
emerge as debtors to demand that their debts 
be discharged.
More broadly, the path to debtor as an empowered political identity is 
smoothed when the society surrounding debtors also questions the legit-
imacy of debts. Because of the considerable scrutiny of for-profit colleges 
by Attorneys General, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the 
media during 2013, public opinion became increasingly critical of these 
institutions. The Corinthian 15 benefitted from this relatively supportive 
social environment, which greatly bolstered both their visibility and their own 
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convictions about the morality of their actions. Here, these debtors as well 
as the wider public—77% of whom have debts themselves—were willing to 
contextualize different debt relationships, perhaps reserving some as just 
and binding, while understanding others as odious and disputable. 
While the Corinthian Strike showed debt’s moral universe to be pliable, and 
an already-present capacity in both debtors and wider society to distin-
guish between legitimate and illegitimate debts, reprisals are far less flex-
ible. Because of the severity of potential consequences, the Debt Collective 
had to offer multiple methods of engagement in debt resistance, and in fact 
ended up proving the pliability not only of debt’s moral frameworks but of its 
legal frameworks as well.
Of the thousands of debtors who contacted the Debt Collective wanting to 
join the strike, it quickly became clear that
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the specificity and intersectionality of people’s 
indebtedness—were they already in default? 
Were their wages or tax returns already being 
garnished? Did they have children to feed? Did 
they have intergenerational family wealth to 
rely on?—was central to how they might strate-
gically participate in debt resistance actions. 
The vast majority of debtors with whom Debt Collective organizers spoke 
decided not to strike after organizers explained the serious financial risks. 
The Debt Collective pioneered the Defense to Repayment (DTR) tool for this 
reason. Because people’s ability to access daily needs is so intertwined with 
debt in the contemporary era, and predicated on technologies like credit 
scores, a debt strike is not a realistic or reasonable ask for many people, 
especially in its early stages. In the case of people for whom the reprisals 
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detailed in Table 1 exact too much of a toll, debtors willing to politicize their 
identity as such also need legal tools (vs. a strike which, as a contract 
breach, remains on the margins of legality) with which to push back. These 
legal tools should amplify the broader messages of the strike and allow 
for mass participation, but protect those who choose to use them from 
reprisals. 
In addition to those who would choose not to strike, Debt Collective orga-
nizers also found that a high number of potential strikers were already in 
default on their loans, and often already suffering the consequences—
trashed credit scores, wage and tax return garnishment. These debtors were 
defaulting and suffering the consequences alone, with neither leverage nor 
voice in the financial system. These were strikers by necessity. The act of 
defaulting together, and politicizing that collective default (“Can’t Pay, Won’t 
Pay”) offered the opportunity to find empowerment and collective action in 
what had previously meant increased vulnerability and isolation. 
Still another category of debtor was not yet in default, but did not have 
the means to reliably and continuously pay. Debt Collective organizers 
talked many would-be strikers or DTR applicants through the government’s 
income-based repayment plan (IBR)—another important and underutilized 
existing option for relief.  Many of these imperiled debtors ultimately decided 
to strike or apply for DTR as well. As detailed above, 
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eventually over 80,000 people used the Debt 
Collective’s DTR tool, inaugurating a long and 
ongoing process that fundamentally changed 
federal education policy, discharged over 
1 billion dollars in debt for Debt Collective 
union members, placed a union member 
on a Negotiated Rulemaking committee in 
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Washington DC, and generated a series of 
ongoing lawsuits to thwart the Trump adminis-
tration’s attempts to roll back these gains.
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Prior to the Debt Collective’s organizing work, the Defense to Repayment 
clause of the Higher Education Act was essentially dormant within the law. 
It was debtors’ collective action that activated this little-known legal clause 
and made it work for them. By submitting personal information including 
descriptions of fraudulent claims made by their schools, for-profit college 
debtors were able to legally press an already-existing but little-known right. 
In other words, the collective struggle of for-profit debtors gave new meaning 
and new consequences to hitherto ambiguous legal frameworks for debt 
discharge.
In short, a debtors’ movement has to pay attention to exactly where house-
holds are with respect to their debt payments and to their differential vulner-
ability to financial consequences. For people able to make payments and / 
or unable to face reprisals, cultivating their identities as debtors requires the 
provision of concrete services (like the DTR tool or help applying to IBR) and 
broader collective education around systemic debt. Even if they choose not 
to strike, inviting debtors 
to see that they are not 
alone (a loan) in their 
financial struggles shows 
that the situation is not 
their fault, and perhaps 
that there is some hope 
or ethic in collective 
action. For people unable 
to make payments, but 
also unable or unwilling 
to suffer consequences, 
legal tools must also 
be available, as well as 
Lesson 3: INTERSECTIONALITYAND DIVERSITY OFTACTICS
Households are differentially vulnerable to reprisals 
from debt refusal. For households without access to
intergenerational wealth, households with children, 
households with histories of incarceration, or 
households reliant on already-precarious public 
benefits, the threats a strike would pose to their credit 
scores or public benefit access or even the threat of 
re-arrest often makes intentional nonpayment too much 
of a risk. Thus a legal tool—like Defense to Repayment—
allows for mass participation while protecting 
differentially vulnerable households from reprisals.
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referrals to other kinds of services 
and mutual aid for the provision of 
housing and food for those in dire 
need (a situation that came up among 
single mothers in particular over the 
course of Debt Collective organizing.) 
And finally, for those people already 
experiencing reprisals, a strike can 
be a welcome collectivization and 
activation of their struggles, which had 
hitherto been experienced alone.
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THE CORINTHIAN STRIKE AND 
POSSIBILITIES OF DEBT BASED ACTIVISM
The potential to exercise mass financial power toward a more just and 
equitable society in the age of finance is the ultimate promise of debtors’ 
unions.
Though small and siloed in the face of 
systemic indebtedness, the significant 
victories of the Corinthian strike—$1 
billion in debt discharge and rapid 
federal policy changes—demonstrate 
the promise and potential of a broader 
movement.
In just two years, with only a handful dedicated organizers, the pilot strike 
garnered not tangible victories for some strikers (including both current 
debt discharge and past-payment refunds - Figure 12) but also significant 
changes in the public conversation around student debt. Citing the work of 
the Debt Collective and others, the Movement for Black Lives policy platform 
included full debt discharge and free higher education as the first demand 
of their reparations plank.132 NBC’s hit show The Goodwife ran an episode 
(November 1, 2015) modeled explicitly on the Corinthian strike, in which 
students at a for-profit college went on a debt strike. The Corinthian union 
drew critical attention to the creditor (in this case the federal government), 
the regulation of lending and the means of financing goods and services. 
Thus, the strike publicly forced the question of how and by whom the things 
we care about—education, in this case—are funded, and what purpose they 
ultimately serve. As sociologist Tressie McMillan Cottom (2015) wrote of The 
Debt Collective’s work:
Already, the debate about if college should be free has forced us all to consider what 
higher education is for. We’re dusting off old words like class and race and labor. We 
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are even casting about for new words like ‘precariat’ and ‘generation debt.’ The Debt 
Collective is a prime example of this. The group of hundreds of students and gradu-
ates of (mostly) for-profit colleges are doing the hard work of forming a class-based 
identity around debt as opposed to work or income. The broader cultural conversa-
tion about student debt, to which free college plans are a response, sets the stage 
for that kind of work. The good of those conversations outweighs for me the limited 
democratization potential of free college.133
While giving these victories appropriate recognition, the Debt Collective’s 
pilot campaign also displayed serious shortcomings and lessons learned 
in terms of the ultimate goal of exercising mass political power. We briefly 
discuss two here. First, the question of campaign silos by debt-type; second, 
the double-edged question of legitimate vs. illegitimate debts.
Both during and after the Corinthian campaign, the Debt Collective was 
often understood—by press, by funders, by fellow activists and organizers, 
by academics—as a student debt organization, or even specifically a 
for-profit student debt organization siloed from both systemic household 
debt and even from other student debtors. By virtue of the organization’s 
small size and minimal funding (all organizing labor was volunteer through 
the end of 2016, when only two organizers began receiving small sala-
ries), there was limited capacity to broaden the scope of work. In targeting 
for-profit colleges, the Debt Collective strategically sacrificed a systemic 
analysis for a “bad apples” win to secure an important proof of concept. In 
other words, the Corinthian strike undoubtedly put a bad apple out of busi-
ness, and won significant debt relief for those 
who deserved it, but in so doing it potentially 
made other student debts, or even other 
types of debts, look legitimate by compar-
ison. The kinds of collective power mass 
indebtedness potentially affords will only be 
exercised when collective action can leverage 
systemic indebtedness rather than siloed 
indebtedness.134 
Corinthian was a clear case of illegitimate debt—a predatory lender 
masquerading as an institution of higher learning. This clarity allowed both 
potential strikers and the general public to support the idea of a strike, while 
potentially opposing more far-reaching debt refusal tactics, such as striking 
debt from non-profit colleges and universities. Thus, while the legitimate / 
illegitimate distinction may be helpful in the short term as debtors’ unions 
emerge on the public radar, it poses the risk of regressive effects if not prop-
erly managed. 
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Labor unions present a helpful 
analogy here. Labor unions don’t 
only aim to give workers power 
over the worst possible working 
conditions. Rather, they aim to 
provide generalizable worker 
power to participate in all contract 
terms, even for excellent jobs. 
Labor organizing seeks a seat at 
the bargaining table alongside 
capital and the state. So too should 
debtors’ unions. It cannot only 
be the most odious debts - crim-
inal justice debt; for-profit college 
debt; predatory payday loans 
— that are deemed deserving of 
challenge. Rather, debtors must 
(1) gain generalizable power over
the contracts they enter such that
they can demand and achieve fair
terms; and (2) use their generaliz-
able power to definancialize public
goods and services.
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The Debt Collective’s post-pilot work aims 
to respond to these shortcomings. First, 
in an effort to expand beyond the student 
debt silo, The Debt Collective expanded 
its focus toward building an online platform 
and tool suite that allows both individual and 
collective debt disputes across multiple debt 
types, as well as online discussions and 
autonomous organizing discussions among 
union members. (Figure 13)
Since late 2018, Debt Collective organizers 
have brought these online tools into commu-
nity organizing spaces, including One D.C. 
(Washington DC), Homeboy Industries, 
Community Action Network, Youth Justice 
Coalition, and Community Coalition in Los Angeles, Ujima in Boston, and 
various Democratic Socialists of America groups in New York, California, 
Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, Texas, and Nevada. The idea 
is to put these tools in the hands of organizers with large existing bases, 
first to enable their membership to dispute individual debts, and then to 
coordinate the use of these dispute tools collectively to prospectively make 
demands for the kind of society we 
want to see: one where you don’t have 
to go into debilitating debt for your own 
incarceration, healthcare, education, or 
utilities.
Second, to acknowledge the most 
unconscionable intersections of finan-
cialization, race and debt, the Debt 
Collective has joined a statewide coali-
tion in California—Debt Free Justice135—
to eliminate fines, fees, and bail in the 
criminal legal system. As detailed in 
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Section II, criminal legal debts are borne disproportionately by women of 
color living at or below the poverty line who often assume responsibility for 
debts incurred by loved ones in the system. Organizing from an intersectional 
framework, the Debt Collective’s participation in this coalition follows the lead 
of organizations led by system-impacted people and families. 
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The Debt Collective joins as an ally in this 
coalition, bringing experience in debtor orga-
nizing and following the lead of system-af-
fected organizers who have the expertise and 
analysis that comes from lived experience in 
the criminal legal system.
Responding to the demands of coalition members, the Debt Collective is 
working to build a bail debt dispute tool similar to Defense To Repayment. 
This tool would scale novel legal work already underway that sends demand 
letters to bail bonds companies identifying potential violations of California 
consumer protection law.
Making this tool available to system-affected families would allow them not 
only to resist their own debts, but also to orchestrate collective disputes (for 
instance, timed with strategic moments in the statewide legislative campaign) 
in which thousands or hundreds of thousands of people could submit 
disputes at the same time. This kind of legal collective action has the poten-
tial to generate wide public attention to the ways that debt in the criminal 
legal system sucks resources out of already impoverished communities. 
As the idea of Debtors’ Unions remains nascent in the contemporary U.S., 
the work of the Debt Collective - and the meaningful wins in their pilot 
strike - offers an exciting precedent. How their work is able to scale and 
expand remains to be seen. For now, perhaps the most exciting possibilities 
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for future organizing may come from the back-end database of the Debt 
Collective’s online platform, which has the potential to generate crucial new 
data on collective indebtedness and those willing to fight it. As debtors join 
the platform, and (securely, with consent) contribute geographic, identity, 
and creditor / servicer / aggregator information, organizers and debtors alike 
will be able to see new patterns and potentials for future collective actions.
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Far beyond the work of the Debt Collective, there are significant signs that 
the U.S. may be approaching a watershed shift around approaches to debt 
resistance and the reimagining of finance. 
Where participants in Occupy Wall 
Street were derided less than a decade 
ago for their demands of student debt 
jubilee, today, there is a growing list of 
politicians at both the state and federal 
level for whom this is a central aspect 
of their platform.
Presidential Candidate Bernie Sanders, congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio 
Cortez, and New York state assemblyman Ron Kim among many others 
have all campaigned actively on this issue, and many have sought the 
counsel of the Debt Collective in drafting their policy platforms. Sanders’ 
presidential campaign commissioned a widely-publicized report on The 
Macroeconomic Effects of Student Debt Cancellation,136 and recent polling 
suggests that Democrats broadly support student debt cancellation as a 
policy option (Figure 14).137
The Debt Free Justice California 
Coalition has also seen significant early 
victories. In December 2018 Alameda 
County became the second county in 
the state to eliminate criminal justice 
administration fees and discharge all 
outstanding probation fees, public 
defender fees, and sheriff’s work alter-
native program fees. As of January 
2019, Alameda county will discharge 
$26 million in outstanding debt and 
charge no fees going forward.138 
In the twenty-first century, a public education system 
that goes from early childhood education through 
high school is not good enough. We must make 
public colleges and universities tuition-free.
@BernieSanders
Bernie Sanders
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Scaled proposals to address vast household debt overhangs are emerging 
and gaining traction. An innovative plan put forth by Cornell Law Professor 
Robert Hockett139 in which cities use eminent domain to buy up foreclosed 
properties and keep owners in their homes, has expanded to other debt 
types despite aggressive pushback.140 Saqib Bhatti, Director of the ReFund 
America Project, and others have proposed methods by which municipali-
ties, individually or in coalition, might also refuse their debts to Wall Street, 
or collectively bargain to renegotiate loan and swap terms.141 The institu-
tionally-scaled emergent horizon presented by Public Banks has also seen 
recent wins, particularly in California with 8 cities including Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, and Sacramento exploring Public Banking legislation142. While 
African American and Caribbean scholars and social movements have made 
the case for reparations for centuries,143 March 2019 saw New York Times 
“center-right” columnist David Brooks make an argument in favor of repara-
tions for African- and Native Americans.144 Debtors unions acting in support 
of these movements could provide considerable economic and political 
leverage. In combination with these exciting and emergent alternatives in the 
future of finance, Debtors Unions also present a method to redress some 
of the ugliest and ongoing profiteering from the 2008 crisis. For instance, 
the concentrated corporate ownership of residential housing stock that has 
emerged as big banks and private equity firms transform foreclosed proper-
ties into spectacularly profitable Wall St-owned rental housing presents one 
potential target.145 Imagine a future where renters can collectively negotiate 
with their Blackstone Group or Colony Capital landlords, not as individuals 
desperate for housing, but as a union bolstered by the potential of a rent 
strike, the threat of municipal eminent domain, and public banking finance. 
There is power in a debtor’s union.
conclusion
Fig. 14
Responses to the questions: 
would you support or oppose
reversing the tax cuts recently 
passed by congressional 
republicans and signed by 
President Trump, and using 
any proceeds to cancel 
outstanding student debt?
All
48%
28%
18%
12% 14%
6% 7% 7%
28%
8% 10%
13%
Democrats
Strongly support Somewhat support Neither support 
nor oppose
Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose Not sure
Democrats Back Student Debt Cancellation
source: Jordan Weissmann/Slate
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